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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
According to theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “ideas look very different in the 
ripeness of their maturity than in the freshness of their birth”1; this observation is 
particularly pertinent to the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, not only on the level of 
his own literary development, but also within the context of his evolving culture. 
Within the field of modern literary criticism and American cultural studies, the work 
of R.W. Emerson is primarily regarded and classfied as the prototype of the pragmatic 
theory. However, the over-emphasis of Emerson’s forecasting of the American 
Pragmatism indeed overcasts the nascence of those very ideas which in their origin 
embody the idea of  “transformation”.  
As significant is the fact that America was born at the Age of Reason and in 
the early nineteenth century gained headship in all things having to do with 
technology -- settings its course for its pragmatic, modern endeavors -- another 
significant factor played a determining role in its forming “modernity”: its direct 
encounter with the fiction-enticing space of the “New World”. Taken together both 
factors generated the dramatic change of consciousness, where the new and altered 
perspectives of the world demanded man’s new relation to his environment -- 
instigating a translation of the original ideas into the new apprehensions, in other 
words, creating new world-views and myths. Emerson was, as is recognized, an 
important part of this “translating” activity but what is more important is that he was 
himself gradually becoming aware of it; seriously investigating the effect of the 
mythopoeic power both on his work and in human life in general. Therefore, a single 
interpretation of his body of work is in contrast to his ambition to explicate the 
workings of myth and its transitional means. Hence, this study attempts to reveal 
Emerson’s text in the light of his mythopoeic interest and to demonstrate that unity 
was as important for his work as multiplicity, stagnation as well as action, for it is 
always in the way of transition that Emerson recognized mythopoeia to take its 
course. More over, this study attempts to outline -- in order to point out -- to what 
extend  his own theory of mythopoeic and symbolic expression anticipated America’s 
own growing awareness of the importance of the mythic and imaginative expression 
for the human experience. Kenneth Burke in what appears as direct exaltation of 
                                               
1
 As quoted in Roger Lundin’s From Nature to Experience: American Search for Cultural Authority 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) 4; hereafter cited in the text as Lundin. 
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Emerson’s notion of symbolic expression, implied in his work Language as Symbolic 
Action that,  
humanity would do well to picture nature as a dynamic, creative process rather than 
as an inert, alien realm. It is not a question of an idea being abstract true or false, it is a 
question of an idea making imaginative sense in that it helps us step outside our limited 
common-sense [my emphasis] way of seeing2.  
Perhaps the best way to express this reading’s point of interest is as Lewis 
Mumford pointed out -- strangely but most poignantly -- through the words of a 
scholar who placed little value to Emerson’s thoughts and methods3, George Edward 
Woodberry. “[…] By the features of this doctrine”, Woodberry wrote of Emerson’s 
essays, 
      its mingling of physics and being, its divorce from Christian mythology, its 
freedom from past civilization, its priority to science and logic, its truly primitive 
methods of thought in conducting the mind still untrained and still grasping 
knowledge imperfectly, one is reminded of the early sages of Greece […].4  
Indeed, for in both cases, agreeing with Mumford’s interpretation, this originality and 
imperfection are the markers of the embryonic expression of a new culture5. What 
Woodberry aimed to be a negative evaluation of Emerson’s work actually points out 
the very way of transition embedded in Emerson’s creative impulse. 
 
 The discussion and explication of the study is centered on Emerson’s essays 
for in this form of narrative Emerson was able to best explore and demonstrate the 
mythopoeic function; not only through the import of their meaning but also through 
stylistic and expressive rendering on the textual surface. His essays Nature and 
“Experience” were chosen to serve as the main models for demonstrating Emerson’s 
exploration of the mythopoeic function, because not only do they well reflect 
Emerson’s own developing ideas on myth but they stand as epitome of mythopoeia’s 
double connotation: both destructive and liberating in its nature. Other essays that 
were included in the study were those that are important pieces in tracing the 
progressive development of Emerson’s particular theory of symbolic expression: 
“Circles” from his Essays, “The Poet” and “Nature” from his Essays: Second Series, 
                                               
2
 Laurence Coupe, Myth (London: Routledge, 2009) 92; hereafter cited in the text as Coupe. 
3
 Lewis Mumford, “Introduction”: Emerson’s Essays and Journals, Ed. Lewis Mumford (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1968) 29; hereafter cited in the text as Mumford. 
4
  As quoted in Mumford’s Emerson’s Essays and Journals, 29. 
5
 Mumford, 29. 
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and “Poetry and Imagination”- a less known piece, but of particular value for this 
study. Furthermore, Emerson’s oratory “Method of Nature” constitutes a significant 
part of the study for supporting the claims made on the grounds of the essays with its 
important insights into the mythopoeic theme. Additional support and justification 
was drawn from Emerson’s private writings; being a prolific writer, both in his 
professional and private life, his journal entries, letters and other, less directly 
relevant, essays supplied pertinent contributions to the topic.  
 Before conducting the actual interpretation of the “Emersonian essay” in 
connection to the mythopoeic faculty, which is undertaken in chapter 2, an overview 
is provided in chapter 1 of myth’s definition and place within modern literary 
criticism and philosophy. Its purpose is to introduce, in light of Emerson’s own 
exploration, the central problems and debates associated to the subject. Chapter 3 
further expands on the contribution of mythopoeia to Emerson’s style, use and 
formation of his particular theory of symbolic expression and pointing out its link to 
contemporary literary theories concerning imagination and fiction. The last chapter is 
dedicated to tracing parallels between Emerson’s anticipation of mythopoeia’s 
importance within human experience and modernity’s growing interest in the 
necessity of mythopoeia and mythic narratives for human subsistence -- particularly 
as exemplified in the work of Clifford Geertz and his approach to anthropological 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1: MYTHOS 
 
Before going any further into the study of the mythological dimension of 
Emerson’s works, it is necessary to define the terms “myth” and “mythology” as well 
as to locate their place in and relevance to both literary and cultural studies.  Defining 
“myth” is not a simple matter for the term seems to have gained a valency for a 
number of varied definitions. For F. Max Müller, for example, the mythical world is 
essentially a world of illusion caused by a language’s inherent defect 6 - “disease of 
language”7. On the other hand, for the German Romantics myth presented the highest 
mode of truth8. René Wellek and Austin Warren in their Theory of Literature agree 
that the “term is not easy to fix”9: 
[…] In the 17th and 18th centuries […] the term had commonly a pejorative 
connotation: a myth was a fiction – scientifically or historically untrue. But already 
in the “Scienza Nuova” of Vico, the emphasis has shifted to what since the German 
Romantics, Coleridge, Emerson, and Nietzsche, has become gradually dominant – 
the conception of ‘myth’ as, like poetry, a kind of truth or equivalent of truth, not a 
competition to historic or scientific truth but a supplement.10   
In addition, already from the time of Nietzsche’s philosophy, this supposed antinomy 
of fiction and truth itself comes to a radical reconsideration. Therefore, the only 
manner by which to attain a proper conception of “myth” is to not conceive of it as 
defining a single fixed concept but standing for special state of consciousness 
demarcated not by the contraposition of the opposing poles of “fictitiousness” and 
“reality” -- for that very opposition is, as Wolfgang Iser points out, a “tacit 
knowledge” a “storehouse of beliefs that seem so soundly based that their truth may 
be taken for granted”11, which already implies a certain degree of mythologizing -- 
but by the interaction of the two. The following sections attempt to exemplify the 
shifting stance towards this state, to portray how the change of consciousness’ attitude 
                                               
6
 Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, 1953), 
7; hereafter cited in the text as Cassirer. 
7
 Burton Feldman and Robert D. Richardson Jr., The Rise of Modern Mythology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1972) 481; hereafter cited in the text as Feldman and Richardson. 
8
 Feldman and Richardson, 303. 
9
 Austin Warren and René Wellek. Theory of Literature (London: Peregrine Books, 1963) 191; 
hereafter cited in the text as Warren and Wellek. 
10
 Warren, and Wellek, 191. 
11
 Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology (London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993) 1; hereafter cited in the text as Iser. 
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towards the relationship between “myth” and “reality” demonstrates the 
transformations and complexities of the mythologizing activity itself. 
 
 
1.1 MYTHOCLASM 
 
Beginning with F. Max Müller’s “disease of language”, myth by certain 
mythological approaches earned this unflattering characterization for its property to 
affect the “proper” function of language. In case of Müller coming from a hard-
headed philological position12, his famous comparative study of the Greek myths and 
Aryan languages, where he explained Greek myths based on etymological parallels to 
their Aryan origins, lead him to conclude that there is always a slippage between 
words and things - an inherent weakness of language13 - and this linguistic ambiguity 
is the source of all myths14. Myth for Müller is “the dark shadow which language 
throws upon thought, and which can never disappear till language becomes entirely 
commensurate with thought, which it never will”15. The only way, in Müller’s point 
of view, to overcome this imprecision of language is through comparative philology, 
conceived of as a sort of scientific etymology: “to find a supposedly disinterested and 
scientific method”16. 
 F. Max Müller was writing at a time what Robert D. Richardson called,  
[…] a second Enlightenment […;] The later 19th century […] assessment of myth 
may be described as a revival of rationalism,  […] that confined its serious interest 
in myth to anthropology and gave myth back to the not very highly esteemed 
‘savage mind’17.  
Indeed, it was during the period of Enlightenment that aimed, through the progressive 
operations of critical reason, at “human emancipation from myth”, superstition and 
captivation of nature’s mysterious powers18.  During the periods of Enlightenment and 
the Victorian Age myth posed a threat to the times’ rationalistic and genteel mind 
sets, in each case there was a “systematic attempt to explain away mythology”19 and 
                                               
12
 Feldman and Richardson, 481. 
13
 Feldman and Richardson, 480. 
14
 Cassirer, 4. 
15
 Cassirer, 5. 
16
 Feldman and Richardson, 482. 
17
 Feldman and Richardson, 483. 
18
 Thomas Docherty quoted in Coupe’s Myth, 110. 
19
 Coupe, 10. 
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one can begin to see, as Richardson claims, “a process at work simplifying, refining, 
and bowdlerizing myth for popular consumption”20.  
However, along side the trend to deride myth and its seriousness a counter 
current that considers myth other than a “defect” of the mind has not completely been 
subverted. In fact, important to point out for our later discussion, the very extreme 
emphasis placed on reason is paradoxically what has propelled myth in its other 
understanding – not as a hindrance to knowledge but its liberator. Particularly one 
philosopher of the times of rational and scientific inquiry serves as the epitome 
example of this paradox. Through the 18th century, mythology served the rationalist 
purpose as a rich source of parallels and counterclaims upsetting to revealed religion; 
in the philosophy of David Hume however, “for the first time in any significant way” 
myth becomes embarrassing for free thought and atheism, and for rationality as 
well21. Although Hume still maintained enlightenment’s contempt for myth (found it 
of no intellectual value) he saw in it not just an impediment for religion but for 
rationality as well. Particularly in his “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion” where 
Hume is arguing against dogmatism either of a rational or religious kind, he implies a 
novel view of myth22: by arguing that knowledge is limited to experience, he opens 
the way for myth to gain a status of own autonomy and not inferior to rationality. 
This, although only implied view, remained in Ernst Cassirer’s judgment an isolated 
event in the Enlightenment because the “century still believed in the power of reason 
too much to follow Hume in renouncing it”23. Nevertheless, it was Hume’s relentless 
skepticism, attacking all authority over man’s knowledge of the world, that tapped the 
surface for “the remarkable freedom and urgency with which post-Kantian and 
Romantic mythologists”24 broke through to myth for the very means to counter the 
rationalists’ philosophies. Emerson was well read in Hume’s philosophy and he 
“struggled against Hume for years”25. To a great extent, as will be examined in more 
detail in later chapter, Emerson’s life and work constituted a refutation of the 
skepticism represented by Hume, which consequently lead to Emerson’s own exercise 
in myth and development of ideas on the subject of mythology. 
                                               
20
 Feldman and Richardson, 300. 
21
 Ibid., 157. 
22
 Ibid., 158. 
23
 Ibid., 160. 
24
 Ibid., 160. 
25
 Richardson, Robert D, Jr., Emerson:The Mind on Fire (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1995), 31; hereafter cited in the text as Richardson. 
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1.2 MYTHOPOEIA 
 
The one source of affirmation Emerson found for his own intuitive inquiry into 
the subject of myth was in the works of the German Romantics; but as René Wellek 
points out in his Confrontations:  
Emerson, one feels, was looking among the Germans [Schelling, Hegel, Herder, 
the list is significant] for support for his faith. He found it there, and that is why he 
praised them, though mostly from a distance. He was not interested in the process 
of their thinking. He was merely interested in their results, which seemed to him a 
confirmation of a world view which contradicted and refuted the materialism of the 
18th century.26 
As both René Wellek and M.H. Abrams have portrayed, myth becomes a 
major concern of Romantic thinking and literature. Particularly in the German 
Romantic movement, although of short duration, myth was raised to a prominent 
status; asserted and celebrated not only the body of knowledge presented by the 
collections of myths - their narrative, linguistic and historical specifics, but more 
importantly, newly, for representing a mode of knowledge that would counterbalance 
and “revitalize the material and mechanical universe which had emerged” from the 
rationalist theories particularly “[…] dramatized in the later 18th century”.27 What was 
a common mission for the Romantics was essentially, as M.H. Abrams claims, for 
“healing”:  
[….] an attempt to overcome the sense of man’s alienation from the world by 
healing the cleavage between subject and object, between the vital, purposeful, 
value-full world of private experience and the dead postulated world of extension, 
quantity, and motion. To establish that man shares his own life with the nature was 
to reanimate the dead universe of the materialists, and at the same time most 
effectively to tie man back into his milieu.28  
The writers and thinkers of this movement searched for new modes of organizing 
experience, new ways of seeing the outer world and “a new set of relations of the 
                                               
26
 René Wellek,. Confrontations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 202; hereafter cited in 
the text as Confrontations. 
27
 M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp:Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition  (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., 1958), 65; hereafter cited in the text as The Mirror. 
28
 The Mirror, 65. 
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individual to himself, to nature to history and to his fellow men”29. In myth they 
found the synthesizing ground on which to formulate their ambitions, for to them 
myth points back to what poetry seemed to be in the primal beginnings of the human 
race, a unity of thought, art and belief30. 
Such unity is what Friedrich Schlegel hoped be realized for the modern future. 
Unity he regarded as the most vital part of art, philosophy and understanding in 
general and thus it was not enough to merely be sensitive to beautiful passages and 
fragments (both in works of art and in life) but be able to seize the impression of the 
whole, “since the first condition of all understanding, and hence also of the 
understating of a work or art, is an intuition of the whole.”31 But this is what he felt 
lacking at his time: “absence of a firm basis […], a matrix, a sky, a living atmosphere 
[…] as mythology provided for the ancients”32. His famous statement of this 
“modern” hope for new mythology he put forward in the “Athenaum” where he calls 
for a “progressive universal poetry”33 : 
Such poetry of art, deliberately breaking the limits set in the past, will blend 
philosophy with poetry, will blend all genres, will reconcile all dualities, and will 
realize all possibilities.34  
Schlegel found “literature” too narrow to meet his intentions and “religion” too 
orthodox, but myth fit his “new meaning ideally because myth joined literature and 
religion inseparably by illuminating for modernity the missing link between art and 
faith”35. However, as Wellek points out, Schlegel “[…] does not mean by myth 
merely a new cosmology or an exploitation of philosophical concepts; he thinks of it, 
rather, as a system of correspondences and symbols”36; a new system of relationships, 
a “hieroglyphical expression of surrounding nature”37 brought to light and being by 
individual spirit or inspiration. The “disorder that might originate from the abundance 
                                               
29
 M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1971), 14; hereafter cited in the text as Natural Supernaturalism. 
30
 Feldman and Richardson, 307. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Friedrich Schlegel, “Talk on Mythology” [trans. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc], The Rise of Modern 
Mythology. Ed. B. Feldman and R.D. Richardson Jr., 310; hereafter cited in the text as “Talk on 
Mythology”. 
33
 Friedrich Schlegel, “The Athenaeum: Aphorism no. 116” [trans. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc], The 
Rise of Modern Mythology. Ed. B. Feldman and R.D. Richardson Jr., 313. 
34
 Feldman and Richardson, 307. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
  “Talk on Mythology”, 312. 
37
 René Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism, vol..II (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 17; hereafter 
quoted in text as A History of Modern Criticism, vol. II. 
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from [such] poetic creations”38 to Schlegel represents the truly fertile and creative 
medium: for “the highest beauty, indeed the highest order is yet only that of chaos, 
namely of such a one that waits only for the touch of love to unfold as a harmonious 
world, of such a chaos as the ancient mythology and poetry were”39. For Schlegel the 
“unity” of the universe has to do with the synthesis of the individual spirit with nature 
through the force of love. In connection to this, Schlegel raises an important point: the 
evidence that in essence the world is paradoxical and man is driven for it’s 
overcoming is made evident by the function of irony: “Irony is a clear consciousness 
of the infinitely full chaos […]”40 but it is also highly self-conscious, a self-parody, as 
he says, “transcendental buffoonery”41. On the other hand, “love […] is the human 
equivalent to the mysterious principle of organic form”42 thus individuals may follow 
nature in structure and organization in the causation of love43. Through this scheme of 
forces Schlegel envisions a synthesis between the ideal and the real - that a new 
mythology “will emerge from such grounds based on the harmony of the ideal and 
real”44. 
For other reason that myth became an essential part to the German Romantics’ 
(for Romantics in general) agenda, was for its aid in the move from conventional 
religion. As Abrams reminds,  
the process [of progressive secularization] […] has not been the deletions and 
replacement of religious ideas but rather the assimilation and reinterpretation of 
religious ideas, as constitutive elements in a world view founded on secular 
premises.45 
 Abrams continues to highlight the fact that much of the Romantic writers  
undertook, whatever their religious creed or lack of creed, to save traditional 
concepts, schemes, and values which had been based on the relation of the Creator 
to his creatures and creation, but to reformulate them within prevailing two-term 
system of subject and object, ego-non ego, the human mind or consciousness and 
its transaction with nature.46 
                                               
38
 “Talk on Mythology”, 310. 
39
  Ibid. 
40
 Schlegel as quoted in Wellek’s A History of Modern Criticism, vol.II, 15. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Zdeněk Hrbata, a  Martin Procházka, Romantismus a romantismy: Pojmy, Proudy, Kontexty (Prague: 
Charles Univesity Press, 2005), 193; hereafter cited in the text as Hrbata and Procházka. 
43
 Hrbata and Procházka, 193. 
44
 “Talk on Mythology”, 310. 
45
 Natural Supernaturalism, 13. 
46
 Natural Supernaturalism, 14. 
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 In other words, again pointing out the need the Romantics felt to conceive of a “new 
world view” but essentially, as Feldman and Richardson, proclaim: “[…] myth was a 
major vehicle by which Christianity was secularized into romanticism”47. Particularly 
in the works of Friedrich W. J. Schelling we can observe the conscious use of myth 
for this transformation of religious ideas and imagery.  
As did Schlegel, Schelling stressed the nature as an organic spiritualized realm 
and for him human consciousness was a higher stage beyond nature, most importantly 
though, he described both as resulting from God’s creative self-unfolding48. The 
supreme tool for understanding this creative Spirit or Will is for Schelling found in 
art; and myth he regards as the primal expression of art on one side, and as its ultimate 
culmination on the other. Schelling felt that this culmination could be rendered in a 
total metaphysical system, the result of which -- “System of Transcendental Idealism” 
-- expands on the concept of idealism of a striving, “self-transcending human subject 
into a creatively striving, self-transcending Absolute Mind or Spirit”49. Spirit is what 
comes to know itself by objectifying itself50. Very important part to this system is 
Schelling’s idea that Spirit moves through distinct, progressive stages – not merely 
stages in history, but what he calls “potencies”, ascending levels of spiritual 
possibility51; “first the Spirit moves into the objectively real, or Nature; then into 
subjectivity, or human consciousness as it grasps the ideal; but then into the still 
higher recognition of the identity between the ideal and real.”52 He regards this whole 
process the “poetry” of the Spirit because it shows how Spirit is “literally ‘making’ 
itself real”53. In this system Nature as such is therefore still the primitive, unconscious 
poetry of the Spirit but man is nature grown into consciousness54. Schelling thus then 
reaches by his own means an agreement with Schlegel that art in its essentially 
mythical function is the “mediatress between, and reconcile of nature and man.”55 
This relation between mythology and revelation that the Romantics accentuated in 
their works is all-important for discussing the role of myth for Emerson in the context 
of his nation’s Puritan heritage. 
                                               
47
 Feldman and Richardson, 298. 
48
 Ibid., 315. 
49
 Ibid., 317. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid., 316. 
53
 Ibid., 317 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 The Mirror, 50. 
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1.3 CHAOSMOS  
 
Despite the Romantics’ aim to out-do scientific rationalism with their stress on 
the qualities of poetry, their outcome of “systems” speaks of the fact that the very 
subject matter of myth instigates a need for an arrangement a method of some kind. 
Perhaps Umberto Eco’s term “chaosmos”56 speaks the best for these “systems” that 
assumes both order and disorder simultaneously. The very “subject” of the 
Romantics’ systems, as it appears, begins in contradictions and paradoxes, using 
Schelling’s words:  
          contradiction is life’s main spring and core […]. If there were only unity, and if 
everything were at peace, then truly nothing would want to stir, and everything 
would sink into listlessness.57  
In fact, as Abrams describes, “the system of Romantic philosophy […] is itself 
represented as a moving system […]”58. Here pointing-out yet another paradox - the 
system itself is ceaselessly changing; a moving system which is “driven by an internal 
source of motion to its own completion”59. In fact the system is a process, an 
“immanently propelled and ever evolving process of oppositions, reconciliations, and 
renewed oppositions, moving toward a final state in which all oppositions will be 
reconciled”60. For the Romantics, these contradictions are caused by man’s 
consciousness to reflect “sundering the eternal and original unity”61 of the Spirit 
which thus manifests itself in its divided subject-object form both in the realm of 
nature and of mind. Thus, essentially, as for example Schelling exemplified, in the 
“Romantic as in Neoplatonic thought, division, separateness, externality, isolation are 
equated with evil”62; however, a “necessary evil” because, without this division 
caused by human consciousness there would not be the freedom to take action which 
is according to Schelling the essence of being human63. This initiates the move to the 
                                               
56
 Umberto Eco’s description of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake in The Aesthetics of Chaosmos: The Middle 
Ages of James Joyce (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989). 
57
 Friedrich Schelling as quoted in Wellek’s Natural Supernaturalism, 173.  
58
 Natural Supernaturalism. 172. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Schelling as quoted in Abrams’.Natural Supernaturalism, 180. 
62
 Natural Supernaturalism, 181. 
63
 Hrbata and Procházka, 31. 
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individual experience as the central to the Romantic’s concern. Thus, essentially “for 
Schelling”, using Procházka’s key description,  
      nature is a virtual structure the realization of which renders the creation and limits 
of our experience; […] nature thus is the realm outside of man yet consequently 
“the world of human experience64.  
Thus, Myth or Poetry, in other words language employed intuitively and 
imaginatively, was the one mode for the Romantics which was able to heal this 
“malignity” of separation, because myth’s ability to reconcile “the finite with the 
infinite, the shaping of divine power into form”.65 For the Romantics, only through 
such process that would not do away with the differences but use them to strive for 
“unity which is higher, […] [because incorporating] the intervening differentiations”66 
“can then man return to nature in triumph.”67 
 In the “chaosmos” of the Romantic systems already some prefiguring of the 
development of the modern approaches to the concept and genre of “fiction” can be 
traced. The Romantic’s idealism with its stress on the creative and imaginative facets 
of language lead to a re-evaluation of the actual “idealism”; if in fact these facets are 
as “un-realistic” as supposed. It was Nietzsche who garnered the results of these 
polemics concluding, as Hans Vaihinger sums up:  
That life and science are not possible without imaginary or false conceptions […]. 
[…T]hat this ‘invented’ world [reality] is a justified and ‘indispensable’ ‘myth’; 
from which it finally follows that ‘false’ and ‘true’ are ‘relative’ concepts.68 
This variance on myth’s status promoted a third alternative view, one that neither can  
reject myth for its falseness nor uphold myth as some “higher” truths, for it is a 
necessary formative agent of the human experience of the world. Thus, ultimately for 
Nietzsche the “fictive” is to not be discredited but looked at as “[…] to what extent is 
it advantageous to life”69. As Wolfgang Iser explained, it is when “usage” takes over 
“knowledge” that fiction takes on new significance70. For Ernst Cassirer such neo-
Kantian stance is an essential point of view on understanding myth because from this 
conception: “myth […]appears as symbol; not in the sense of mere figure which refer 
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to some given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical rendering, but in the 
sense of forces [my emphasis] [that]posit a world of its own”71. Here we are reminded 
of Procházka’s rendering of Schelling’s system as “a virtual structure” where “truth” 
is bonded to the specific realizations of its potential within experience. This perhaps is 
most acutely rendered in the philosophy of the “As – If” of Hans Vaihinger, who as 
Iser explains, saw, as Kant did, through the illusion of the world as being the result of 
the “ideating, fictionalizing consciousness”72. However, apart from just seeing 
through it he considered and formulated its vital, practical importance to human life. 
Compared to the German Romantics, for whom the idea of creating a new 
“chaosmos” was for the purpose of achieving their main goal: the emergence of new 
unity, the English Romantics used the concept of creating a new universe to 
illuminate the very process of such creation73. For example Hrbata and Procházka 
demonstrate how Coleridge’s inclusion of a fictitious letter from a friend giving him 
advice about his literary work in the eight chapter of his “Biographia Literaria” is not 
just a “mere deception to get away from a philosophical elaboration of his theory on 
imagination, but a gesture of creative freedom”74. This gesture then represents a realm 
of its own implying a new and  
profound meaning of imagination. […] It is a fragment, which seeks a new form 
of content, a form that “mobilize[s] the whole by the very act of variedly 
breaking it.75  
Perhaps the epitome example of such “chaosmic” ambition is William Blake’s 
prophetic poems. Contrary to the German’s emphasis on gaining a new ground for 
unity and harmony, Blake in fact finds such aims blinding and dangerous76. He 
employed myth for what he found the most important purpose, “fragmentary creation 
of the universe in all its plurality and diversity”77.  As Procházka point’s out, Blake’s 
mythic vision does not represent mere allegory “which always stand[s] for something 
else (character personalities, moral and religious truths, philosophical concepts, Ideas, 
God) but for a “vision creating worlds, which do not exist anywhere but within 
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itself”78. Burton Feldman further emphasizes the point Procházka made in connection 
to Coleridge’s mystification: “Taken together, [Blake’s] poems set forth a new 
cosmogony, and interpretation of man’s creation […].”79 Just as the other Romantics 
attempted to retain the Christian values in a new format Blake sought to do the same, 
but again through only unfamiliar means, “claiming to find support for a mythic 
revision of Christian tradition in its heresiarchal side.”80 For Blake the eminent 
wisdom lies in this acknowledgement and emanation of this diversity of perspectives. 
In his words: “the Eye altering alters all.”81  This “altering” power is the dynamic 
process caused by the ceaseless energy of life and conjuring of a mythical vision, i.e. 
making the world anew, is “his battle against the constraining command of rational 
thought” 82 and remains one of the most important themes of his prophetic poetry83. 
On such ground the prophet is equaled to the poet, Blake makes these two converge 
together, for to see the world anew is equal to making the world anew84: “the poem-
in-being is its own and utterly self-sufficient world”85. Thus important differentiation 
is made here for mythology; rather then mythology presenting something as “being” it 
encapsulates the power of “becoming” or in other words, mythology stands for “the 
creative act by which a poet, emulating Divinity, brings possibility over into the realm 
of being”86. 
Wolfgang Iser in his The Fictive and the Imaginary explains, that “it is a character 
of all true fictions, that they contain contradictions”87 and it is such “crossing of 
boundaries” that modern conceptions of “fictionalization” have in common: 
Just as the fictionalizing act outstrips the determinacy of the real, so it provides the 
imaginary with the determinacy that it would not otherwise possess. In so doing, it 
enables the imaginary to take on an essential quality of the real, for determinacy is 
a minimal definition of reality. This is not, of course, to say that the imaginary is 
real, although it certainly assumes an appearance of reality in the way it intrudes 
into and acts upon the given world. 
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[…] Reproduced reality is made to point to a ‘reality’ beyond itself, while the 
imaginary is lured into form. In each case there is a crossing of boundaries: the 
determinacy of reality is exceeded at the same time that the diffuseness of the 
imaginary is controlled and called into form. Consequently, extratextual reality 
merges into imaginary, and the imaginary merges into reality.88 
If for the German Romantics the act of mythopoeia revealed God’s self-unfolding, in 
the case of modern fiction the boundary-crossing as Iser explains, “opens the 
complexities of action” 89 and thus “cannot have the nature of an object, because it is 
an imaginary construct that sets free possibilities inherent in situations and does not 
pin them down to any pre given conditions”90, in this case, not revealing the Ideal but 
the actuality of the presence91. However, Iser’s regard of fiction being a “sort of repair 
kit for conceptualization”92 is appropriate for both movements, for in either case it 
presents an act “[which] must inevitably transcend the concepts it seeks to 
encompass”93.  In Emerson’s work on the subject we may observe the point of 
transition from the religious ambitions of the Romantics to the psycho-literary 
theories (for example of Ernst Cassirer, Kenneth Burke or Wolfgang Iser); or rather in 
his philosophy the two converge into his own distinctive “chaosmos” of literary 
expression. 
 
 
1.4 THE NEW SCIENCE 
 
After considering German Romantics’ insistence on creating a new mode or 
system of understanding, which Martin Procházka -- pointing out its paradoxical 
character -- fittingly calls it, using Gilles Deleuze’s term, not “transcendental 
idealism” but “transcendental empiricism”94 it is pertinent to discuss the parallel 
intentions of the precedent, bold and original works of Giambattista Vico. Although 
coming from a setting of 17th century rationalism Vico’s thoughts on myth anticipated 
much of 19th and 20th century interest in poetry and mythology, particularly for 
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presenting the first instance where myth is regarded as an autonomous for itself95. 
Although his fame begins with the Romantic period, where his work provided the 
Romantics with motifs to serve their antirationalist or antiscientific intentions, what 
essentially was at the heart of his interest was to develop (exceptionally to both 
Romantics and the Rationalists) “new science” that would not ignore or reject myth,  
but understand myth; “for Vico, no true human science is possible or worthy unless it 
can account for why human society necessarily involved myth, and this neither the 
natural law rationalist not the Christians could do.”96 Vico instead of the 17th century 
focus on nature as a separate entity from the human with its own laws (Descartes, 
Hobbes, Spinoza) emphasized the reverse: that the spiritual or human can now be seen 
as free from rigid obedience to nature’s law, thus turning the scientific enquiry 
inwards. For him humanity needs to be explored in terms of how it necessarily 
develops ideas, expresses them and perpetuates them, and myth was the key to this 
understanding. Vico declares in his “New Science”: “science must begin where its 
subject matter begins”97. Thus, as Feldman explains, Vico’s most important effect is 
his proclamation that our whole civilized and rational world springs from the fist step 
forward, and by grasping what caused this first all-important event, we can grasp the 
principle by which humanity in general begins and develops98: “true science of 
humanity does not begin with men more or less rational and fully humanized, but with 
mythic men as they in fact were - Vico says, […] insensate and horrible beasts”99.  
Hence, for Vico,  
      poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun with a 
metaphysics not rational and abstract like that of  learned men now, but felt and 
imagined as that of these first men must have been, who without power of 
ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous imagination.100  
Vico then establishes the foundation for the “expressive theory”101, where the primal 
language of poetry comes from the very passions of man himself in response to the 
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frightening and awe-inspiring surrounding of his natural world102. Poetry or myth is 
thus the “master key” to the origins of humanity103. Vico by laying the ground for the 
synthesizing of the two seeming contraries anticipates the later approaches to 
mythology; implicitly in the case of the Romantic’s, like Schelling’s and Schlegel’s 
“psycho-natural parallelism”104 of their systems; but the modern approaches 
particularly, such as Jung’s psychological approach, psycho-linguistic studies of Ernst 
Cassirer, Hans Vaihinger’s phenomenology of “As-If”, myth as semiological system 
in works of Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss for example, and Clifford 
Geertz’s phenomenology of culture, are the outcome of the tendency to “naturalize 
the supernatural, and humanize the divine.”105 
The other important contribution of Vico’s “New Science” to the subject of 
myth is his situating a correspondence between myth and language. Through his 
presentation of cultural development as a cyclic structure, he originally, as Hayden 
White in his presentation of the “New Science” in The Tropics of History emphasized, 
considers: 
speech itself [as providing] the key for interpreting cultural phenomena and the 
categories by which the evolutionary stages of a given culture can be 
characterized.106 
Vico puts forward that it is through the capabilities of the language of a given stage in 
the cycle that create the world107. He developed an analogous model where “the 
theory of metaphorical transformation serves as the model for a theory of the 
autotransformation of human consciousness in history.”108 What is important to 
emphasize here of Vico’s contribution for our later discussion, is the development of 
the idea of myth’s narrative structure as reflecting not merely unquestionable 
truths/illusion but rather anthropological and historical needs. 
Johann Gottfried Herder expanding first on Vico’s ideas was to assert that all 
myth not only seems alive and true to its believers, but indeed is true. In the line with 
Blake’s cosmologies that represent the varied perspective of Experience, Herder 
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continues the discussion, remarking, and foreshadowing the modernist theories, that 
“myth then is never simply false, but only relatively so, that is, false to those who 
have other myths, other world-views”109. The concept which for example prompted 
Vaihinger to condense his investigation of the subject on “activated sensations” 110: 
for “[o]nly what is felt, what confronts us in the world of perception, whether it be 
internal of external, is real”111. 
  What is implied in the tracings of these developments is that consequently myth 
has become to be conceived as ultimately being about the present moment. Kenneth 
Burke thinks of myth as “the temporizing of essence”112; where it speaks of “origins 
and ‘firsts’ […] it is always speaking simultaneously of the nature of things here and 
now”113. It is exactly this temporizing quality of myth that distinguishes it from either 
poetry or science as both without mythic predication merely present an “empty” 
thought – either retrospect or prospect, but by the utility of myth may conceive of the 
“qualitative” knowledge of their essence within a specific experience; because, as 
according to Ricoeur, the “already” and the “not yet” are only present in the “here and 
now”114. Clifford Geertz expands on this thought by proclaiming that,  
        [i]n man neither regnant fields nor mental sets can be formed with sufficient 
precision in the absence of guidance from symbolic models of emotion. In order 
to make up our minds we must know how we feel about things; and to know how 
we feel about things we need the public images of sentiment that only ritual, 
myth and art provide.115 
Consequently, this indistinctness, or rather variableness, of the nature of myth’s 
method shifted the discussion from “Truth” versus “Falsity” to what Vaihinger 
considers “intentionality” of the subjective consciousness’ needs at a given moment: 
Cold is a degree of temperature that is unsuitable for us, warm that which is most 
suitable. The difference between them objectively is merely one of degree. 
Subjectively the difference can be shifted according to the circumstances and the 
nature of the object concerned. In the same manner, truth is merely the most 
expedient degree of error, and error the least expedient degree of ideation, of 
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fiction. We call our conceptual world true when it permits us best to gauge 
objectivity and to act therein.116 
  Roland Barthes describes it as myth’s “value”:  
       Myth is a value, truth is no guarantee for it, nothing prevents it from being a 
perpetual alibi […]. The meaning is always there to present the form, the form is 
there to outdistance the meaning. And there is never any contradiction. […]  
Myth is a type of speech defined by its intention. 117 
From here it is only a step away, from the pragmatics’ idea of the “cash value” 
of experience; in which case  
[t]ruth has to do not with the relationship between language and reality, but the 
effectiveness and profitability of an idea’s yield118. 
 In this sense the Pragmatist finds irrelevant to ask, as Robert Lundin points out, what 
is Truth, rather, in what way will the acceptance of truth be realized in a person’s 
experience: “In what way, [William] James ask[ed] will a person’s experience be 
different from those that we would obtain if the belief were false.”119 
If the modern approaches no longer question myth’s legitimacy for knowledge 
in the human experience, it is now inquired as a factor of modulation of experience. 
So as this chapter opened with the discussion of myth’s relationship to language, 
being merely an impenetrable illusion produced by language, we conclude the chapter 
– 120 years later – with myth taking on the role of a “narration” of experience open 
for interpretation.  For Claude Lévi-Strauss myth does remain an illusion, however, it 
is an “illusion” with a difference - for that “man can understand the universe and that 
he does understand the universe”120 is a “very important illusion”121 indeed. Lévi-
Strauss explains pointing out myth’s “fabulous” quality,  
         we are becoming more and more interested in this qualitative aspect, and […]  
science, which had a purely quantitative outlook in the 17th to 19th centuries, is 
beginning to integrate the qualitative aspects of reality as well. This 
undoubtedly will enable us to understand a great many things present in 
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mythological thinking which we were in the past prone to dismiss as 
meaningless […]122.   
For Lévi-Strauss, the workings of myth represent human mind’s basic need for order, 
emphasizing that “since, after all, the human mind is only part of the universe, the 
need probably exists because there is some order in the universe and the universe is 
not chaos”123. Thus, myth is considered as a kind of tool or rather a tactic of man’s 
mind “to transform a situation in which there is experienced obscurity […] of some 
sort, into a situation that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious”124. Lévis-Strauss idea 
of “bricolage” where the mind composes all its pre-existing ideas to ceaselessly 
construct for itself “the harmonious world view”:  
[…] is all a matter of shuffling discrete (and concrete) images –totem animals, 
sacred colors, wind directions, sun deities, or whatever – so as to produce symbolic 
structures capable of formulating and communicating objective (which is not to say 
accurate) analysis of the social and physical worlds.125   
Although, Lévi-Strauss points out the way myth still remains inferior to science: 
“myth is unsuccessful in giving man more material power over the environment”126, 
on the other hand he admits, the narrow field of vision of scientific thought:  
scientific thinkers […] use very limited amount of […] mental power. [Scientist] 
use what is needed by [the] profession, […] trade or the particular situation.127  
He goes on to imply the change of quality of the mind as required by the kind of life 
and relationship to nature that the people of specific culture have128. In fact such 
reasoning leads to the implication, already delivered by Nietzsche, and expanded on 
by Vaihinger, that even the scientific oriented mind-set of his time is a mythological 
assemble. 
Lévi-Strauss’ use of “bricolage” is reminiscent with Blake’s mythological 
visions, quoting Franz Boas, of the “mythological worlds [that have been] built up, 
only to be shattered, where the new worlds are built again from its fragments”. 
Perhaps the best word used for this permutational nature of myth is what Clifford 
Geertz, using John Dewey’s quote to illustrate, calls “disposition” of the mind:  
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         Mind is an ‘active and eager background which lies in wait and engages 
whatever comes its way.’ And as such, it is neither an action nor a thing, but an 
organized system of dispositions which finds its manifestation in some actions 
and some things129. 
He continues saying,  
the point is that when we attribute mind to an organism, we are talking about 
neither the organism’s actions nor its products, [but] a capacity and a proneness [to 
perform certain action and produce certain kinds of products]130.  
This modern perspective has quite drastically shifted the Romantic outlook on 
“reflective” thought.  However, although headed now under different terms and 
assigned as agent of the human apparatus rather then of the divine, the concept of the 
“Will” remains still central to the subject: 
psyche works over the material presented to it by the sensations, i.e. elaborates 
the only available foundation […].131 
Or as further exemplified by Geertz:  
It is through culture patterns ordered clusters of significant symbols, that man 
makes sense of the events through which he lives. The study of […] the 
accumulated totality of such patterns, is thus the study of the machinery 
individuals and group of individuals employ to orient themselves in a world 
otherwise opaque.132 
 or by Barthes by raising an important point that,  
[i]t is certain that in this sense mythology harmonizes with the world, not as it is, 
but as it wants to create itself […]133  
 It is at this point that Barthes introduces also the potential danger of the “Usage” (as 
Barthes calls it) of myth as an ideological tool:  
Myths are nothing but this ceaseless, untiring solicitation, this insidious and 
inflexible demand that all men recognize themselves in this image, eternal yet 
bearing a date, which was built of them one day as if for all time. For the Nature, 
in why they are lock up under the pre-text of being eternalized, is nothing but an 
Usage134. 
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Here, harking back to the well-known mythologizing in the clearly rationalist tradition 
of Karl Marx, whose “work and influence most powerfully moves myth toward its 
wide modern usage as a near-synonym of ‘ideology’: the ‘opium of the people’”135. 
His Ideologies, in his words, “illusions of the epoch” are superstructures that reflect 
but also obscure the true hidden reason and premises of history136, like class tension, 
economic structure, material production. For Barthes, myths do not hide however, 
they simplify and purify due to the very principal of myth to transform history into 
nature:  
[…] In passing from history to nature myth acts economically: it abolishes 
the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does 
away with all dialectics, it organizes a world which is without contradictions 
because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it 
establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by 
themselves.137   
Interesting, however, to point out that despite Barthes’ approach to myth coming from 
an absolutely different point of departure compared to the Romantics, in a certain 
sense, he reaches an agreement with them, on myth being a mediator to the 
understanding of the gap between ideas and form. He says,  
mythology is part both of semiology in as much as it is a formal science, and of 
ideology is as much as it is an historical science: it studies ideas-in-form138. 
Leading him to an interesting twist on the characteristics of poets, who 
 of all those who use speech […] are the least formalist, for they are the only 
one who believe that the meaning of the words is only a form, which they, 
being realist, cannot be content.139  
How interesting that the very idealist intentions, of the romantic transcendental 
poetry, in fact leads to them being the most “realist” of all users of language. This 
illustrates well myth’s exceptional nature and validity, leading us to consent with 
Barthes’ conclusion that ultimately “[m]yth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: […] 
myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion.”140  
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This first chapter serving as an overview of the shifting position of mythology 
in literary and cultural studies was rendered in the light of the issues and debates 
central to Emerson’s own thoughts and handling of myth. The following chapters will 
expand on the issues raised in the introduction as particularly reflected by Emerson’s 
writing in hope of revealing the degree of pertinence mythology had for his work, as 
well as, how his own work stands as a contribution into the topic’s incessant tributary. 
For Emerson was both a “myth critic” and “myth maker” and the following chapters 
will attempt to explore both qualities respectively to discover mythology as being of 
central significance to understanding and appreciating the works of “New England’s 
own philosopher-sage”141. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PHILOSOPHER-SAGE 
2.1 TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
Although, R.W. Emerson never presented himself as a mythologist per se or 
addressed the subject in his essays ever explicitly, there are clear signs that reveal that 
already from his boyhood his mind was attracted to characteristically mythological 
subject matter. As Robert D. Richardson points out in his biography on Emerson, his 
journal that he composed during his junior year at Harvard, shows 
 in the most strongest possible contrast to the rationalist curriculum, […] a 
marked and steady interest in imagination, in fairyland, in legend, folktale, 
fiction, and poetry.142  
Yet a teenager’s liking for fantasy and day-dream alone does not stand for a directive 
in one’s mythological inquiry. On the other hand though, Emerson was also a youth 
whose undergraduate poem about India, “Indian Superstition”, shows strong features 
of “xenophobic, condescending, even racist overview of Indic mythology […]”143. 
This suggests that from early on Emerson was attracted and at the same time repulsed 
by religious, “mythological”, sentiment. He could rave about the elevation of the poet 
as a prophet, “the gospel maker”144 but at the same time doubt and ridicule the actual 
presentations of religious and prophetic texts - be it the ancient Indian poetry or 
Hebrew texts. It is this love-hate relationship to religion145 that he developed at an 
early age that provided the fertile ground from which his intellectual and private 
meditations sprung forth.  Such a mind was very attentive to the historical and 
scientific discoveries of his time and particularly of interest were the developing 
theories that put into question the authenticity of the Bible, which consequently lead 
to his increasing uneasiness with the “mediating agencies of Christian experience, be 
they sacramental, traditional, or scriptural”.146 For him the “Christian faith became a 
weary rehearsal of the once-illumination experiences of others”147. On the other hand, 
as engaged in the scientific thought as he was of his day, he was never to leave his 
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own faith for a purely scientific enquiry. He didn’t turn to science in hope to find all 
the evidence to reject spirituality, he turned to it in the faith that the new disciplines 
would provide confirmation of his sense of the sacred: “The new astronomy had 
revealed a world and a universe that could no longer usefully be described as 
fallen”.148 The results of his strong inner spiritual voice and the skeptical eye 
converged to produce in Emerson the unique quality of an approach to life - perhaps 
most well expressed through his own words formulated in “The American Scholar: 
“the ancient precept ‘know thyself’ and the modern precept ‘study nature’, become at 
least one maxim”149. 
It is not mere coincidence then, but rather historically symbolic, that at the 
time when Emerson was developing his own stance on the matters of identity, religion 
and authority that America as a nation was undergoing her own “transformation of 
consciousness”150. Alexis de Tocqueville after his visit to the New World wrote in the 
final chapter of his Democracy in America:  
The time will therefore come when one hundred and fifty million men will be 
living in North America, 100 equal in condition, all belonging to one family, owing 
their origin to the same cause, and preserving the same civilization, the same 
language, the same religion, the same habits, the same manners, and imbued with the 
same opinions, propagated under the same forms. The rest is uncertain, but this is 
certain; and it is a fact new to the world, a fact that the imagination strives in vain to 
grasp151.  
As if in a form of reaction to what Tocqueville sensed to be a blankness of the 
American imagination, caused by the inability to account for the “new facts” 
emerging from the New World, a year later in his Nature Emerson finally proposed: 
“Why should not we […] enjoy an original relation to the universe?” (N: 7)152 By 
proposing that question, in accordance to Sacvan Bercovitch’s analogy of the New 
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World- the “modern world” as the embodiment of the “modern myth”153, Emerson is 
the embodiment of that American mythological formation at work; triggering the 
process that F.O. Matthiessen described as:  
      […a] theory of expression […] on which Thoreau built, to which Whitman gave 
extension, and to which Hawthorne and Melville were indebted by being forced 
to react against [it]154. 
Emerson’s sensitive and insightful mind made him aware that there is no adequate 
narrative for the inhabitants of 19th century America as they “scrambled to orient 
themselves in a cosmos of alarming new proportions”155. “The experience of each 
new age requires a new confession, and the world seems always waiting for its poets” 
(P: 185)156, fittingly to his way, Emerson through this performative statement not only 
constituted the absence but at the same time took on himself the task of filling that 
void -- a role he later deeply examined through his “Poet” -- of the indispensable 
messenger: 
      […] thought and the form are equal in the order of time, but in the order of 
genesis the thought is prior to the form. The poet has a new thought: he has a 
whole new experience to unfold […]. (P: 184)157 
In his essay Emerson renders “the Poet” in a light similar to the German Romantics’, 
where the poet and the mystic fall together and through their voice of poetry provide 
the insight into the depth of being – one’s own being and Being of the universe:  
The poet by an ulterior intellectual perception […] puts eyes, and tongue, into 
every dumb and inanimate object […] so the poet turns the world to glass, and 
shows us all things in their right series and procession. (P: 190)158 
He continues: 
      For, through that better perception, he stands one step nearer to things, and see 
the flowing or metamorphosis; perceives through multiform; that within the form 
of every creature is a force impelling it to ascend into a higher form: and, 
following with his eyes the life, uses the form which expresses that life and so his 
speech flows with nature. (P: 190)159. 
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His maintenance of the performative air through the preceding passages adds thrust 
and fervency to his words, the reader actually witnesses the unfolding of those 
pronouncements, as if one is listening to the very poet so described. Such 
proclamation invigorates Abram’s description of the Romantics’ ambitions: 
to represent themselves in the traditional persona of the philosopher-seer or the 
poet-prophet [to] set out […] to reconstitute the grounds of hope and to announce 
the certainty, or at least the possibility of a rebirth, in which a renewed mankind 
will inhabit a renovated earth where he will find himself thoroughly at home.160  
However, on more than one account Emerson is different from his European counter-
parts. The most obvious difference being found in what Abrams calls the “persona”. 
While the German Romantics revered “the Poet” they still proposed their prophetic 
visions through the recondite language of philosophy and their metaphysical systems. 
Emerson, on the other hand, wanted to keep the human voice audible, in accordance 
to his the believe that “the shared human core that makes communion possible makes 
communication possible”161; in a sense anticipating the much later post-modernist 
tendencies, justified by Abrams usage of a line from Wallace Stevens to exemplify 
Emerson’s prophetic style: “To speak humanly from the height or from the depth of 
human things, that is acutest speech.”162 Emerson insists that,  
the poet is representative. He stands among partial men for the complete man, and 
apprises us not of his wealth, but of the common wealth. (P: 182)163  
Here, far from the German’s superior persona of the poet-bard, Emerson appears to 
come closer to the intentions of William Blake, of creating a universe of the diverse 
perspectives. They both shared the belief and placed importance to the fact that the 
first condition any mythology must fulfil if it is to render life to modern life is that of 
cleansing doors of perception164: to the wonder, both frightening yet fascinating, of 
the universe of which they are the eyes and minds. “Be an opener of doors for such as 
come after thee […]”165 Emerson wrote in his journal June 1844. Just as Blake who 
recognized that the inhabiting effects of myths, when they settle in their static, 
constant meanings, can only be destroyed by the very force of the mythologizing 
process, Emerson too found that myth is mythoclastic when it is functioning truly as 
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myth. All the dogmatism in religion, unsound ideologies of culture and the conceited 
“liberalism” of the sciences can be smashed by Myth. If America was at that time the 
landmark for the transformation of human consciousness, on its path becoming the 
“modern world”, it is only apropos that its mythology reflects that power of 
“transformation”.  Thus, more than having the intention of creating new myths, 
Emerson’s interest and abhorrence to myth has developed into an interest in 
mythopoeic power166; for him “the art is in the process […t]he final product marks 
the end, the death, of [that] process, the point at which fossilization sets in […]”167 or 
in the words of Jonathan Levin, “he [was] more interested in the way, in which we 
believe and doubt – in the actual flow of experience, than in system of belief or a 
systematically sustained scepticism”168. 
The inconsistency and incoherence that Emerson has often been charged 
with169 and his own confession to “a little distrust of that completeness of system 
which metaphysician are apt to affect”170 are the result of this predominant interest to 
make the world open to the force that,  
within the form of every creature […] impel[s] it to ascend into a higher form: and, 
following with his eyes the life, uses the forms which express that life, and so his 
speech flows with nature. (P: 190)171  
In the words of Lewis Mumford, his mission was not to “instruct the would-be 
builders, nor to design a new structures” but:  
he felt impelled to examine all the “crumbling foundations, to condemn 
unsound structures, to clear the site of lumber, to quarry new materials.172 
 For Emerson believed that if America is to “enjoy an original relation to the 
universe” it first needs a cleared field of vision for that narration to come into view:  
by unlocking, at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal tides to roll 
and circulate through him: then [the Poet] is caught up into the life of the 
Universe […]. (P: 193)173 
                                               
166
 Richardson in Mind on Fire finds Emerson to most clearly express this himself in one of his later 
works “Poetry and Imagination”, 517. 
167
 Richardson, 372. 
168
 Levin, Jonathan. The Poetics in Transition, (London: Duke University Press, 1999), 18; hereafter 
cited in the text as Levin. 
169
 Rene Wellek,  A History of  Modern Criticism vol. III, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 164; 
hereafter cited in the text as A History of Modern Criticism vol. III. 
170
 Emerson as cited in Rene Wellek’s Literary Theory vol. III, 164. 
171
 EaP. 
172
 Mumford, Lewis. Emerson’s Essays and Journals, “Introduction”, 29. 
173
 EaP. 
 34 
  
2.2 THE NEW HORIZONS 
 
In “New England Reformers” Emerson said: “[…] society gains nothing 
whilst a man, not himself renovated attempts to renovate things around him”174, and 
further expanding on this idea in “Self-Reliance”:  
Progress is only apparent […] It undergoes continual changes: it is barbarous, it is 
civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not 
amelioration. For everything that is given, something is taken. Society acquires 
new arts, and loses old instincts. […] It may be a question whether machinery does 
not encumber; whether we have not lost by refinement some energy, by a 
Christianity entrenched in establishments and forms some vigour of wild virtue.175 
 Contrary to the time’s enthusiasm for America being the land of promise, the land of 
the future, and the land of progress and contrary to the view that Emerson was one of 
the leading proponents of this enthusiasm, Emerson in fact constantly repeated his 
scepticism towards a future aim, future goal; rather he believed that any “true 
advance” will not involve some remote, utopian image of a future but must manifest 
in the present moment:  
Virtue […] consists in a perpetual substitution of being for seeming, and with 
sublime propriety God is described as saying I AM.176 
 He felt that the two “promises” that constitute the very basis of America: the 
“promise land” and “promise of science” will without the mediating element that can 
relate them meaningfully to the human consciousness enslave men to their luring, yet 
deceitful realities, for “[man] cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with 
nature in the present […]” but that “at the present, man applies to nature but half his 
force.” (N: 46)177 In the “Prospects” of Nature Emerson described the loss of an 
active relationship to the world, where man became, 
the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spirit. He filled 
nature with his overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and moon; 
from man the sun; from woman, the moon. The laws of his mind, the periods of 
his action externized themselves into day and night, into they year and season. 
But, having made for himself this huge shell, his water retired he no longer fills 
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the veins and veinlets he is shrunk to a drop. He sees, that the structure still fits 
him, but fits him colossally. Say, rather, once it fitted him, now it corresponds to 
him from far and on high. He adores timidly his own work. Now is man the 
follower of the sun, and woman the follower of the moon. (N: 46)178   
Emerson felt that the new experience opened for them in the “New World” 
deserved or in fact demanded a “new story” where “the world shall be to us an open 
book, and every form significant of its hidden life and final cause.” (N: 46) 179 
Although for the new inhabitants America represented the expansions of new 
horizons for Emerson horizons no longer existed, or rather, they converged to the very 
ground of its individual members. In this sense it was no longer a community, not 
even a nation, neither civilization that could provide men with an authentic narrative. 
Emerson recognized that the new mythogenic zone was now the individual 
him/herself and the new narration must be a revelation based on that self. If in the 
case of the European romantics “Christianity was secularized into Romanticism” in 
Emerson’s case, as he recorded in his journal in 1838, “what they call […] 
Christianity, I call […] Consciousness”180. 
His essay Nature was his initial attempt of rendering his ideas on the change 
of consciousness that America stands as witness and his proposal of the new 
narration, “a theory that would bring us face to face with nature and transform each 
individual into a representative visionary.”181 This “theory”, revived from its 
conformed definition - a comprehensive account of reality - is reminiscent to the 
energizing power of myth that can, as for example Blake, Schlegel, Schelling, and 
later the neo-Kantians recognized, “reconcile all dualities and thus realize all 
possibilities”182 and most importantly to “effectively tie man back into his milieu;”183 
in other words, to “temporize the essence.”184 
 
 
 
                                               
178
 EaL. 
179
 EaL. 
180
 Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson in His Journals, ed. Joel Porte (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 190. 
181
 Lundin, 65. 
182
 Feldman and Richardson,  307 
183
 The Mirror, 65. 
184
 See reference no. 112. 
 36 
2.3 NATURE’S MYTHOPOEA 
 
In Nature Emerson attempted to break through both the narrow chink of 
conventional religion and the grounds of 19th century science “that […] operated […] 
of what Stanley Cavell calls ‘a paltry idea of experience’”185. As Robert Lundin 
pointed out, Emerson wondered, what is the good of a theory of experience if it 
cannot account for the spiritual as well.186 For he realized when he looked to science 
as the first step in his attempt to open doors to new experience of reality -- away from 
the dead, out serviced institution of the religious tradition -- that that is a truly 
dangerous threshold to cross, for the doctrines and rationale of the empirical sciences 
were actually taking doubt to absolute levels. Expressively described by Lundin,  
      here the stakes were as high as they could be. The wounds inflicted by science were 
superficial and could easily be treated with the salve of idealism but if that idealism 
itself were to become tainted with skepticism, there might be now no way to heal 
the afflicted soul187.  
For Emerson the alarming workings of the empiricist theories were personified in the 
18th century skeptic David Hume. Although, as Lundin discusses, in his earlier age 
Emerson admired Hume for his emphasis of knowledge from experience that served 
Emerson so well for demonstrating that “if God were to be known, it would be 
through sources other than those of sacrament”188, that very theory could in fact 
completely destroy his ambitions for new revelation, by claiming that if we have no 
knowledge but from experience it consequently follows that if there is no experience 
of a creator we cannot know of any. Emerson wrote after reading Hume’s “Essay 
upon Necessary Connexion” that he would like to see “the victorious answer to these 
calumnies upon our nature set down in impregnable propositions”189.  His own essay 
Nature could be understood as his attempted at that answer. 
To reveal the rationalists’ “paltry of an experience” he took the discussion to 
their own ball park. Through the proposition of his new “theory” he turns the 
definition of theory on his head. By claiming that a “true theory is self-evident” and 
that that self-evidence of explaining all phenomena is its validating test, he goes 
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against the time’s rationalist approach, where theory is confirmed through 
observation, through experiment, in other words, in bias-free environment – an 
environment free of human experience. Thus he says, before Nietzsche or Viahinger 
and their proclamations of the practicality of fiction that, 
 [t]here are far more excellent qualities […] than preciseness and infallibility; that a 
guess is often more fruitful than indisputable affirmation, and that a dream may let 
us deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred concerted experiments. (N: 43)190  
Ignoring or not being able to account to these faculties of nature, is where Emerson 
saw the empiricist limitation and, reminiscent to Vico’s ambitions in his “New 
Science”, insisted on turning the scientific enquiry inwards – as Lundin also explains 
quoting Robert Langbaum, “to ‘develop a corrected empiricism’, which would restore 
the epistemological status of inner experience”191. What Vico described as “the first 
wisdom of the gentile world with metaphysics not rational and abstract but felt and 
imagined”192, Nature’s first chapter opens with just such an expression of an ecstatic 
experience:  
   Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under clouded sky, without 
having in my thoughts any occurrences of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a 
perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. […]Standing on the bare 
ground, - my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted to infinite space, - all mean 
egotism vanished. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing, I see all. (N: 
10)193 
The passage illustrates what Ernst Cassirer described as the primal, initial “mythico-
religious protophenomenon”194 – “the prerequisite for all mythical thinking and 
mythical formulation”: 
             […] it is something purely instantaneous, a fleeting, emerging and vanishing 
mental content […]. In stark uniqueness and singleness it confronts us; not as a part 
of some force which may manifest itself here, there and everywhere, in various 
places and times […] but as something that exists only here and now, in one 
indivisible moment of experience, and for only one subject whom it overwhelms 
and holds in thrall.195 
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            For a person whose apprehension is under the spell of this mythico-religious 
attitude, it is as though the whole world were simply annihilated; the immediate 
content, whatever it be, that commands his religious interest so completely fills his 
consciousness that noting else can exist beside and apart from it.196 
If a theory is to require empirical or ecclesiastical verification to Emerson it looses all 
authority, for how can any authority account for an experience as described above. 
Thus, in move drawing on but totally modernizing his Puritan tradition, Emerson 
asks: “why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight” rather than 
tradition and “a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?”(N: 7)197  
Emerson goes on to explain that the key to truth, or rather authenticity, is to approach 
Nature as a reader does a “book”; where the poetic license of interpretation stands for 
that utter self-validation and authentic truth of that experience. This analogy stands 
for the core of his thoughts proclaimed in Nature, where Nature is the “book of its 
hidden and final cause”, “symbol of the spirit”, “metaphor of the human mind”; and 
where the new narrative is the outcome of the process of the “interpretation” – the 
encounter of the Spirit with Nature – “spiritually through us” (as he later 
reemphasized this relationship).198  
 At this point we can observe the close resemblance of Emerson’s “new 
theory” to the definition of myth as expressed by the Romantics. As in the case of 
Friedrich Schlegel where neither literature nor religion could alone render his 
ambitions of his new synthesizing philosophy, in Emerson’s Nature as well, art and 
faith cease merely being two autonomous departments, disconnected from human life 
by being rendered in a scheme where they both are in fact inseparable from human 
experience: “Art [is] a nature passed through the alembic of man” (N: 18)199 and 
“Spirit […] the Supreme Being [that] does not build up nature around us, but puts it 
forth through us [thus] man has access to the entire mind of the Creator” (N: 41)200. In 
such a scheme the border between art and the world is hard to draw, rather it’s an 
evolving process of the same origin; essentially, to Emerson art is synonymous with 
life; and thus as in the credo of the Romantics, science and all modes of knowledge 
                                               
196
 Ibid., 33. 
197
 EaL. 
198
 R.W. Emerson, “Nature”, EaL, 41. 
199
 EaL. 
200
 EaL. 
 39 
are not to focus on the preoccupation with the objective view of things and their 
classification, but on the primal power of subjective feeling: 
 […] since, ‘every object rightly seen, unlocks a new faculty of the soul’. That 
which was unconscious truth, becomes, when interpreted and defined in an object, 
a part of the domain of knowledge, - a new weapon in the magazine of power. (N: 
25)201 
Through his analogy where life is a book and every individual its equally “qualified” 
reader he indeed humanizes the concept of the “Christian revelation”; in a way similar 
to Herder who considered the Bible as passionate, fresh, Oriental poetry202, Emerson 
now turned “revelation” into the process whereby through reading and interpretation, 
just as when enjoying a work of art, humans engage in the pleasures and meanings of 
life. Emerson dedicated another essay entirely to this subject of art equaling life, 
going as far as to proclaim that once art is detached from nature “it is poor and 
low”203 but that, 
[a] true announcement of the law of creation, if a man were found worthy to 
declare [my emphasis] it, would carry art up into the kingdom of nature, and 
destroy its separate and contrasted existence204. 
If myth’s essential function is to relate the human being to his environment, “to most 
effectively tie man back to his milieu”205 then Emerson’s proposed theory of Nature 
represents that mythologizing act, where that “huge shell” of an alienated universe, 
fits man right again, condensing from its heights of distant heavens, to the very region 
of the individual self. Consequently, “in such a scheme there is hardly any place for 
criticism”, as René Wellek points out: 
[c]riticism can only be empathy and identification. Emerson quotes the old saw 
that ‘every scripture is to be interpreted by the same spirit which gave it forth’ as 
the ‘fundamental law of criticism,’ and he boldly asserts that ‘the reader of 
Shakespeare is also a Shakespeare.’ This means ‘the ultimate identity of the artist 
and the spectator’206. 
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Or also the reader and creator, hence achieving the self-validating authority of the act 
in “becoming”. In consequence the other effect Wellek admits to Emerson’s scheme 
is the “qualitative” and “inner” value of experience it achieves to produce - 
foreshadowing what Lévi-Strauss saw as the main contribution of myth to modern 
science:  
that this trend can lead us to believe that between life and thought, there is not the 
absolute gab which was accepted as a matter of fact by the 17th century 
philosophical dualism. […T]hen perhaps we will reach more wisdom, let us say, 
than we think we are capable of.207 
This connection between Emerson’s proposed “new theory” and modern science’s 
focus on the “qualitative” aspect of experience will be returned to and confronted in 
more detail in the final chapter of this study. 
 Bringing the idea of possibility into the realm of the present moment, is as 
Kenneth Burk, or Paul Riceour, Ernst Cassirer and Roland Barthes agree another 
function of the mythologizing activity. Nature achieves this effect; for what is 
proposed through the message Nature in its form represents. Indeed, the work itself is 
an example of the myth-forming process. What is described through the example of 
the Sphinx – “the necessity of Spirit to manifest itself in material form” (N: 25)208 – or 
in other words, “the creative act by which a poet, emulating Divinity, brings 
possibility over into the realm of being”209 Emerson attempts to realize by “taking a 
crack at the Sphinx riddle”, through the means of the composition itself. Thus the 
effect of Nature (as with all Emerson’s essays) is two fold. In its explicit message it 
presents the proposal of a “theory” or rather a mode of knowledge which in its 
message suggests a scheme of a totalizing comprehension exceeding the individual 
dogmas of religions or theories of science and simultaneously by the scope and 
rendering of that explication - through his art - he emulates the creative mystery of the 
force itself. Thus, attaining what he declares at the beginning of his essay that,  
[t]he production of a work of art throws a light upon the mystery of humanity. A 
work of art is an abstract or epitome of the world. It is the result or expression of 
nature, in miniature. (N: 18)210 
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 In this sense what Schlegel and Schelling philosophized as being art’s essential 
mythical function -“the mediatress and reconciler of nature and man”211 Emerson 
literally presents, for his philosophy turned “being” through the facility of the creative 
expression. This is where Emerson exceeds the Germans’ by extending their revival 
of myth in the form of a philosophy towards modernity’s emphasis of myth’s utility in 
the real (q.v. 3.3 and 4). This also helps to explain Emerson depiction of Nature 
through “commodities”. We are told that, 
 […] it is certain that the power to produce this delight, does not reside in nature, 
but in man, or the harmony of both […] Nature , in its ministry to man, is not only 
the material, but is also the processs, and the result. All the parts incessantly work 
into each others hands for the profit of man.  
This idea of Nature’s own essence giving us instrumentality for dealing with our 
human condition (an idea he then later expanded upon in “Method of Nature” q.v. 
3.3). This expresses the germination of the crucial principle common to all of 
Emerson’s works, that which Robert Richardson showed he admired for example 
about the Quaker founder George Fox - for “being an idealist searching to 
‘accommodate the shows of things to the mind’ and realist, ‘always substituting a 
thing for a hollow form’.”212 Combining the idealist with the realist, illuminates the 
connection between the spiritual and the natural, that spiritual is never a realm apart 
from the natural but is instead revealed -- and alone revealed -- through the natural, 
meaning through the “human being”, the “I” by means of creativity. Thus for 
Emerson it did not satisfy to merely expresses the ideal of myth he also attempted at 
its formation in the real, to achieve the harmonious reconciliation of the ideal and the 
real in the cosmos of art - he explains this himself, using Shakespeare’s art as an 
example:  
Shakespeare possesses the power of subordinating nature for the purposes of 
expression, beyond all poets. His imperial muse tosses the creation like a bauble 
from hand to hand, and uses it to embody any caprice of thought that is upper-most 
in his mind. The remotest spaces of nature are visited, and the farthest sundered 
things are brought together, by a subtle spiritual connection. (N: 35)213 
This is the fundamental background on whose surface Emerson would further 
formulate his theory of symbolic expression - the idea which Emerson illustrated 
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himself through his exaltation of Shakespeare for reaching the highest form of 
artistry, proclaiming that: “Shakespeare worked the miracle of mythologizing every 
fact of the common life”214. 
 
 The totalizing effect and harmonious unity, indeed a modern take at a new 
myth that Emerson presented through Nature cannot however be taken as the ultimate 
conclusion of a thinker who in one of his later works said:  
Why pretend that life is so simple a game, when we know how subtle and elusive 
the Proteus is? […] Why fancy that you have all the truth in your keeping? There is 
much to say on all sides.215  
In fact, Emerson’s mythologizing exceeds on a much greater scheme then a single 
narrative.  
 Already in Nature Emerson leaves signs that it is the mythogenic tendencies 
rather than its products that need to be focal concern of the modern mind: “It is 
essential” he says,  
to a true theory of nature and of man, that it should contain somewhat progressive: 
Uses that are exhausted or that may be, and facts that end in the statement, cannot 
be all that is true of this brave lodging wherein man is harbored, and wherein all his 
faculties find appropriate and endless exercise. And all the uses of nature admit of 
being summed in one, which yields the activity of man an infinite scope. Through 
all its kingdoms, to the suburbs and outskirts of things, it is faithful to that cause 
whence it had its origin. It always speak of Spirit. It suggests the absolute. It is a 
perpetual effect. (N: 40)216 
Emerson to be “faithful to that cause” was impelled similarly to Coleridge by 
including the mystification text in the “Biographia Literaria”, to “mobilize the whole 
by the very act of variedly breaking it”.217  
 
 
 
 
                                               
214
 R.W. Emerson as quoted in Wellek’s Literary Theory vol.II,, 175. 
215
 R.W. Emerson, “Montaigne; or, The Skeptic,” EaL, 694; an example used also by Levin in The 
Poetics of Transition to discuss Emerson’s style characteristic of contradictions and multiplicity of 
perspectives.  
216
 EaL. 
217
 Blanchot as quoted in Hrbata’s and Procházka’s Romantismus a romantismy, 189. 
 43 
2.4 “EXPERIENCE’S” MYTHOCLASM 
  
Remembering what power Blake assigned to man’s perception: “the Eye 
altering alters all” Emerson essentially is fascinated, although not always 
comfortable, with this dictatorial power of human perception. Perhaps when he asked 
towards the end of Nature, “Who can set bounds to the possibilities of Man?” (N: 
41)218 it wasn’t a rhetorical question but proposing a serious enquiry. Emerson 
understood that just as a man’s mind is capable of creating a harmonious universe it 
can in one breath destroy it. Man might be God but, as the Orphic poet sang to him, a 
“God in ruins” (N: 45)219. 
 Those thorny thoughts that stand in stark opposition to the smooth veneer of 
Nature accumulated eight years later in the solemn work of “Experience”. 
“Experience”, however, cannot be looked at simply as a work set out to deny all the 
proclamations as narrated by Nature; the relationship is rather much more intricately 
entwined, where the works interpenetrate and in fact “Experience” takes its departure 
from within the other. 
At a closer observance the concepts in “Experience” that appear to contrast to 
those of Nature, are in fact found to be of the very same “nature”- it is the choice of 
perspective that is the difference. What in Nature was developed as “self-validating 
theory” to bring man in wholesome contact with his environment, in “Experience” -- 
by what appears as an act of appropriation of Shakespeare’s inspiration -- “the 
remotest places of nature are visited.” (N: 35)220 This exploration into the very edge 
of meaning results in the discovery that the initial function of the theory of Nature to 
harmonize the world is found solely locked within the isolated circumference of utter 
aloneness. The very “reader” of Nature is in “Experience” the solitary individual, 
incapable of any communication with the outside world. In other words “Experience” 
reveals that what has been embodied in the form of Nature is in fact merely the 
subjective excitement objectified. In austere contrast to Nature’s ecstatic experience 
where “all mean egotism vanishes” (N:10) 221 in “Experience” not even the most 
authentic, private and deepest of experiences, like loosing a loved one, can break 
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these bounds of subjectivity, “teach [us] nothing, nor carry [us] one step into real 
nature”222 (E: 204). What in Nature is portrayed as the “transparent eye-ball” in 
“Experience” is the despotic “lord of life” that only provides the self with incomplete 
pictures of reality. In “Experience” there seems to be no possibility of uniting the 
“many-colored lenses” into one harmonious whole. The reality of Nature with its 
“unison” of plot figured through the metaphor of the act of reading a book is in 
“Experience” shown to be totally derisory. In fact, “Experience” does not build on 
any of such mythic realities of wholeness and unity, but solely presents “a solitary 
performance”: 
[…]subject and an object, it takes so much to make the galvanic circuit complete, 
but magnitude adds nothing. What imports it whether it is Kepler and the sphere; 
Columbus and America; a reader and his book; or puss with her tail? (E: 220) 223  
According to Richard Poirier, the only lesson left by “Experience” is the necessity to  
submit to the poverty of subjectivity, the poverty of self […]. It is only in this 
poverty […] that you find ‘the God’. [Emerson] does not say God but ‘the God’, 
referring thereby to some generative, creative power that in fact only temporarily 
allows expression of itself though the medium of human being224.  
Here Poirier consents, as Lundin shows, with Jonathan Levin’s, commentary on 
“Experience” who said that “myth or metaphor maybe inadequate”225, because along 
with Poirier assertion “whatever figure of order we construct we are aware it is only 
manmade and temporary”226; yet despite this and more importantly, as Levin goes on 
to emphasize in his discussion focused on the multiple-perspective quality of 
Emerson’s work in his The Poetics of Transition, “the mythologizing and metaphor 
generating imagination remains an essential component […].”227 In the essay version 
of “Nature” that follows “Experience” in the Second Series, Emerson expresses direct 
summation of this dual stipulation of the human consciousness: 
       Man carries the world in his head – the whole astronomy and chemistry in a 
thought. Because the history of nature is characterized in his brain, therefore is he 
the prophet and discoverer of her secrets […].228  
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If Nature represented the prophetic and myth forming necessity of the human 
condition then “Experience” stands for the demystifying tendency where perception 
like the “sad, sharp-eyed man, who sees how paltry a game is played, […] refuses to 
play, but blabs the secret”229 of the very prophesy we forget was our creation in the 
first place.   
 Many criticism on Emerson’s work, point out the contradictions found 
between individual essays, but find “Experience” to be the one that achieves success 
in surpassing those contradictions, a good example stands Mark Bauerlein’s 
commentary who said that: 
      in “Experience”, Emerson shows how only a lightsome elasticity of thinking can 
save minds from the ‘chain of physical necessity’ and the imbecility of 
unconscious imitation” and henceforth shows us how to ‘live among surfaces, the 
true art [being] to skate well on them’230. 
This assertion, however, that “Experience” is the celebration of ceaseless change and 
of the tendency that later would embody the “most distinctive and difficult aspect of 
the pragmatic legacy: the mind’s power being indistinguishable from its abiding 
powerlessness”231, is misleadingly attributed to “Experience” alone. After all, the 
voice of “Experience” admits: “I am a fragment and this is a fragment of me.” (E: 
221)232  On contrary, it is the entire complex body of Emerson’s essays that speaks 
for this embedded tendency, for as Stephan Whicher pointed out,  
      [w]e are dealing with a mind that makes any assertion of belief against the felt pull of its 
lurking opposite, the two forming together a total truth of experience than the opposing 
truths of statement of it is composed233. 
Hence, although amelioration of change and transition are significant part of 
Emerson’s essays, coherence, unity and wholeness remain important; not only 
because “these qualities […] always been and still remain psychologically and 
dramatically compelling”234 but because it completes the subject matter of his prime 
interest: to seek liberation both from the manacles of sensual subjectivism and myth’s 
canonization: 
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 I unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred, none are profane; I simply 
experiment; an endless seeker, with no Past at my back. 
 Yet this incessant movement and progression which all things partake, could 
never become sensible to us, but by contrast to some principle of fixture or 
stability […]. Whilst the eternal generation of circles proceeds, the eternal 
generator abides. (C: 154)235 
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 CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE IN THE MIDST 
 
 If “Experience” were the sole essay Emerson had written, then certainly 
readings similar to Bauerlein’s and those of the Pragmatists would be impossible. It is 
because of it’s “transitional dynamic”236 - it’s clastic faculty to disarm what has been 
pre-constructed and then concentrate the fragments to form a new composition that 
such reading comes into being; a by-product of Emerson’s lifetime fascination, with 
the mysterious force that rushes thoughts to form and solidify only to become fervent 
and then be crushed back to thought again. There is no better description of it then 
Emerson’s own:  
  The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly 
small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and that without 
end. That extent to which this generation of circles, wheel without wheel, will go, 
depends on the force of truth of the individual soul. For it is the inert effort of 
each thought, having formed itself into a circular way of circumstance, - as, for 
instance, an empire, rules of an art, a local usage, a religious rite, - to heap itself 
on that ridge, and to solidify, and hem in the life. But if the soul is quick and 
strong, it bursts over that boundary on all sides, and expands another orbit on the 
great deep, which also runs up into a high wave, with attempt to again to stop and 
bind. (C: 147)237 
 It is the oscillation between the push and pull of this twin-principle that 
creates the most unique trait of the Emersonian essay; a self-generative scheme, 
powered by the incessant dialogue between thought and form,  
[where] the length of the discourse indicate[s] the distance betwixt the speaker 
and the hearer. If they were at a perfect understanding in any part, no words 
would be suffered. (C: 151)238 
Emerson’s imaging of generating circles to describe this principle strikes a 
remarkable resemblance to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s contemplation on the problem 
of language:  
  Man lives with his objects chiefly-in fact, since his feeling and acting depends 
on his perception, one may say exclusively - as language presents them to him. By 
the same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, he ensnares 
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himself in it; and each language draws a magic circle around the people to which it 
belongs, a circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out of it into 
another.239 
From this angle, the relation between language and myth comes into full view. The 
following sections will focus on examining Emerson’s use of language and its 
interrelatedness to the mythopoeic faculty to reveal what significant role it has for 
creating the effect of his compositions’ transitional dynamics and its import for the 
development of his distinctive theory of expression. 
 
 3.1 CIRCLES 
 
 “The circle is Emerson’s figure of figures,”240 explains Jonathan Levin: it is a 
figure that has “dual connotations, […] it is both a limit and a dynamic force.”241 In 
agreement with Levin, the circle is Emerson’s figure of choice for representing his 
notion of symbolic language in general. The “dual connotation” that Levin points-out 
is the key to understanding the function of Emerson’s use of symbols and 
simultaneously the technique by which his writings implications extend over the 
textual level. 
 Indeed, symbols and metaphors for Emerson stand for that twin-principle as 
exemplified by the two essays discussed in the previous chapter; for on one hand, 
symbolic language can stand for the manifestation of what Ernst Cassirer described as 
“the curse of mediacy”242, and on the other, the products of the spontaneous force of 
generation, an original way and tendency of expression. The kind of skepticism 
described in “Experience” toward any outward manifestation of principles, truths, and 
judgments passed on the world, condenses for Emerson on Cassirer’s delineation of 
the language problem, Emerson says: “As I am, so I see; use what language we will, 
we can never say anything but what we are.” (E: 219)243 Emerson educes the modern 
thoughts of his day, where the linguistic theories and language criticism settled to 
regard the alleged truth of language for complete dissolution and accept that this 
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“truth” is nothing but a sort of “phantasmagoria of the spirit”244.  In a manner 
reminiscent to Max Müller’s diction Emerson continues:  
      Perhaps these subject-lenses have a creative power […].Once we lived in what we 
saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new power, which threatens to absorb all 
things, engages us. Nature, art, persons, letters, religions, objects, successively 
tumble in, and God is but one of its ideas. Nature and literature are subjective 
phenomena; every evil and every good thing is a shadow which we cast. (E: 217)245 
 However, unlike Müller’s argument that hence poetic language or mythic narratives 
are merely the “dark shadow which language throws upon thought,”246 where 
symbols’ denotation is ascribed to a mere suggestion, a mental defect,  
which in face of the concrete variegation and totality of actual experience, must 
always appear a poor and empty shell,247 
 Emerson’s skepticism reaches a different conclusion; for it is in the contrast between 
the varied coloration of nature -- the many-colored lenses of experience -- and the 
“unbound substance”, the infinite string on which the beads of colors are strung and 
which changes not, that reveals to him the hope that through the means of symbolic 
expression -- the process by which the two will be attuned to one another -- human 
beings can access authentic reality: 
That which proceeds in succession might be remembered, but that which is co-
existent, or ejaculated from a deeper cause, as yet far from being conscious, know 
not its own tendency. So is it with us, now skeptical, or without unity, because 
immersed in forms and effects all seeming to be of equal yet hostile value […]. 
Bear with these distractions, with this coetaneous growth of the parts: they will one 
day be members, and obey one will. On that one will, on that secret cause, they nail 
our attention and hope. Life is hereby melted into an expectation or a religion. 
Underneath the inharmonious and trivial particulars, is a musical profession, the 
Ideal journeying always with us, - the heaven without rent or seam. Do but observe 
the mode of our illumination. When I converse with a profound mind, or if at any 
time, being alone, I have good thoughts, I do not at one arrive at satisfaction, as 
when, being thirsty, I drink water, or go to the fire, being cold: no! but I am at first 
apprised of my vicinity to a new and excellent region of life. By persisting to read 
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or to think, this region gives further sign of itself, as it were in flash of light, in 
sudden discoveries of its profound beauty and repose […]. (E: 215)248  
In a similar method applied in Nature, Emerson in “Experience” uses the empiricist 
theory only to topple it over on the grounds of its own principles. It is from this angle 
one may start perceiving the interrelatedness of Nature to “Experience”, where the 
seeming contradictions, in fact are annexed by the very process of the “double 
connotation”. “Experience” emulates the skeptic’s world-view but, as it does so, that 
very world-view is driven to eat itself up, for the presented scheme of rational and 
objective empiricism in clash with the subjective perspective drives those very 
empiricist’s principles of classification, organization, and summarization of the “real” 
world to nothing but the same “illusionary” fragments of the mind -- as in the drama 
of the kitten who is in fact chasing nothing other but its own tail. Paradoxically then, 
it appears that the empiricists’ theories, like those presented by Müller, turn out more 
idealist rather than realist for their assumption that there is some nature of things 
outside the mediating reality of language. For Emerson, on the other hand, the 
question as to what those “ideals” may be and what is their independent meaning 
“Experience” makes irrelevant. “Experience” instead proposes the question: “why not 
realize your world?” (E: 222)249 There invoking the words of Nature’s “Idealism” that 
said:  
Whether nature enjoys a substantial existence without or is only in the apocalypse 
of the mind, it is alike useful and alike venerable to me. Be it what it may, it is 
ideal to me, so long as I cannot try the accuracy of my senses. (N: 32)250 
And it is the empiricists who ridicule themselves by claiming to by-pass the senses by 
applying their “objective” experiments and tests, yet in the end always only “taking 
their own tests of success.” (E: 222)251 Contrary to his time’s “realists”, Emerson, 
does not assume any “givens”, which man is to outwardly identify, for all those 
“givens” are essentially gifts from himself - as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
its own prophecy. At this point we find that “Experience’s” conclusion “to set-up the 
strong present tense” (E: 212)252 correlates with his revamped version of “Nature” 
included in the Second Series, that said: 
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      […] if, instead of identifying ourselves with the work, we feel that the soul of the 
workman streams through us, we shall find the peace of the morning dwelling first 
in out hearts, and the fathomless powers of gravity and chemistry, and over them, 
of life, pre-existing within us in their highest form. (C: 148)253 
It is in the seeming contradiction of Nature and “Experience”, neither of whose 
individual final meanings are in fact “final” for both is invaded by the other, that 
exposes the shaping of the dynamic nature of Emerson’s theory of expression -- as he 
put forward in his essay “Circles” -- where nothing is ever “contradicted by the new 
[but] is only limited by the new” (C: 148)254 in order to be transcended. Hence, even 
the particular Cratylism presented in Nature is rather ostensible and cannot be taken 
as entirely forthright in expressing Emerson’s complete thoughts on language, which 
are not revealed in full until his Second Series. However, in “Circles” he already 
provides more clues on the direction his theory of expression set to course. 
 In “Circles” he does restate that nature is the revelation of God’s word:  
These manifold tenacious qualities, this chemistry and vegetation, these metals and 
animals, which seem to stand there for their own sake, are means and methods 
only, are words of God, and as fugitive as other words. (C: 152)255 
What is stressed here is that Nature does not imply fixity - for nature is a “method”, 
where Emerson implies its narrative, evolving structure: 
[e]very ultimate fact is the first of a new series; every general law only a particular 
fact of some more general law presently to disclose itself256. 
 Most importantly, it emphasizes the role of agency of the “human power” (C: 
146)257, for it is man who “finishes the story” (C: 147)258  and so the “double-
connotation” of comprehensiveness and limitation rest in this human faculty of 
creativity. Humans are this universal power’s primary organ through which it 
ceaselessly rewrites reality and enables the Universe to look at itself in each new 
episode: 
  In common hours society sits cold and statuesque. We all stand waiting, empty, - 
knowing, possibly, that we can be full, surrounded by mighty symbols which are 
not symbols to us, but prose and trivial toys. Then cometh the god, and converts the 
statues into fiery men and by flash of his eye burns up the veil which shrouded all 
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things and the meaning of the very furniture, of cup and saucer, of chair and clock 
and tester, is manifest. The facts which loomed so large in the fogs yesterday, - 
property, climate, breeding, personal beauty, and the like, have strangely changed 
their proportions. All that we reckoned settled shakes now and rattles and literature, 
cities, climates, religions, leave their foundations, and dance before our eyes. (C: 
151)259 
 Thus, the notion of Cratylism, where nature is the inspirer of language, is imparted 
and developed by the introduction of the mediation of human perception, often for 
Emerson signified by the pun of the metonymic and synecdochic use of the “I/eye”: 
The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; and throughout 
nature this primary figure is repeated without end. It is the highest emblem in the 
cipher of the world. (C: 146)260  
 This mediator is what Emerson comes to consider the most vital in understanding 
man’s position in the universe, for it is the force that mediates both the language of 
nature (i.e. evolution) and is the same force that acts on every individual’s self-
expression, leading him to espouse the principle that becomes now the dominant 
feature of his works, that: “so to be is the sole inlet of so to know.” (C: 155)261 Thus, 
in such a scheme symbols and metaphors no longer simply present a mere 
“suggestions” or allegories of a natural “facts” but are the forces that mediate and 
produce the world as beheld by human consciousness -- an agent which is at once the 
“transcendent unifier”262 yet present and active only through the particularities of 
individual experience of the here and now. For as he says later in “The Poet”: 
[…] we are not pans and borrow, nor even porters of the fire and torch-bearers, but 
children of the fire, made of it, and only the same divinity transmuted. (P: 182)263  
 “The Poet” is perhaps his most revealing work on his theory of symbolism, 
where he directly confronts what he implied in passing in his first series of essays - 
his faith in the unswerving relationship between external world and man’s inner 
experience, and where human capability of symbolic expression stands for the 
expression of the Universe itself: “[…] for all men have the thoughts of which the 
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universe is the celebration.” (P: 187) 264 Not coincidently, this essay, composed 
simultaneously with “Experience”, reformulates Emerson’s growing interest in the 
“revelationary” importance of the individual experience. “The Poet” reaffirms the 
correspondence of art with life,  where literary symbols don’t allude to concepts or 
things outside the work of art, but are the organs for the spirit, or energy of the creator 
– where the work created being the Universe itself, or as he formulates it: “Art is the 
path of the creator to his work.” (P: 119)265 
 He begins the essay in similar tone of his previous works, like Nature and 
“Art”, where he complains of man’s detachment from Nature and expresses his belief 
that through art and creative expression that detachment may be repaired: 
There is no man who does not anticipate a supersensual utility in the sun, and stars, 
earth, and water. These stand and wait to render him a peculiar service. But there is 
some obstruction, or some excess of phlegm in our constitution, which does not 
suffer them to yield the due effect. The impression of nature fall on us too feebly to 
make us artists. (P: 182)266    
He accounts this problem to the misunderstanding of the relationship between spirit 
and form, that his contemporaries have “lost the perception of the instant dependence 
of form upon soul” (P: 182)267 and that this results in the conflict in his present 
society where spirituality and naturalism are adversaries. In “The Poet” Emerson 
places his faith in the power of reconciliation possessed by human awareness, an 
awareness that stands for Emerson as the ultimate purpose of Man and each man 
where under passion or enthusiasm spirituality and nature are brought together. It 
particularly emphasizes the role of the Poet, who is the interpreter -- “the sayer and 
namer” (P: 183)268 -- not the creator, by reporting on his enliven senses by 
experiencing the world under rapture. Here it is just a step away from the 
understanding how nature, the nature of human experience, thus must be interpreted 
as the symbol of the human consciousness. But that is not the ultimate symbol; the 
ultimate symbol in Emerson’s conception, is the primary circle, as he described in his 
first line in “Circles”, of the human being to that universal Power; the creative force, 
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undefined spirit, the Will, the mystery, the God that realizes itself through us, which 
makes man “[…] only half himself, the other half is his expression.” (P:182)269 
  Moreover, “The Poet” further expands on what was already implied in 
“Circles”: the formulation of the important distinction between the inert, dead words, 
and the life-infusing, universe-revealing, symbol-creating process. For when symbols, 
are past the process of creating a new concept, and like in the case of  the rings of 
each circle are only pending in their limitations, they naturally create their walls and 
boundaries, consequently, “every thought is a prison; every heaven is also a prison.” 
(P: 196)270  However, the important point being, that human consciousness -- the 
symbol being aware of its self -- “the child of the fire”, delights in the breaking of 
those boundaries because: 
      the metamorphosis excites in the beholder an emotion of joy. The use of symbols 
has a certain power of emancipation and exhilaration for all men. […] We are like 
persons who come out of a cave or cellar into the open air. (P: 194)271  
It is in this liberation that Emerson finds the essence of being human and is the source 
of his optimism and faith that Man and society may be invigorated again; for as Levin 
described the “transitionl dynamic”: “at all times, circles enclose us, but their limits 
provide the basis for their own overcoming”272 and the human “I” serves both as the 
witness and carrier for the mythopoeic power capable of breaking through and 
transform “the barbarism and materialism of the times” into a new poem. (P: 198)273 
  On this plane Emerson’s world-view starts to unite consciousness with 
sacredness. Where “the inwardness, and mystery, of this attachment” (P: 188)274 - of 
human being’s participation in the unfolding of the world through symbolic 
expression – implies a natural communion: 
 the ideal shall be real to [the Poet], and the impressions of the actual world shall 
fall like summer rain, copious, but not troublesome, to [his] invulnerable essence. 
Ernst Cassirer’s interpretation of symbols, that remarkably parallel’s Emerson’s 
conception, serves well as explication of this communion, 
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      Man lives with forms and objects only in so far as he lives with these symbols; he 
reveals reality to himself, and himself to reality, in that he lets himself and the 
environment enter into this plastic medium […]275. 
In this realm nature and man do not merely make contact, but blend with one another, 
and constitutes Emerson’s conception of the Divine: 
 [h]ere we find ourselves, suddenly, not in the pleasant walks of critical speculation, 
but in a holy place, and should go very warily and reverently. We stand before the 
secret of the world, there where Being passes into Appearance and Unity into 
Variety. (P: 187)276 
Hence it is profligate to try and understand the gab between nature and man, but 
instead Emerson reaffirms what he already implied in “Experience” to “set up the 
strong present tense.”(E: 212)277 In other words fully participate in the sacred circles’ 
unfolding. To Emerson, the only way the Poet may achieve this is “to speak” the 
immediate experience and realize “the transformation of genius into practical power,” 
(E: 222)278 for what Emerson regards to be the most important is that each man’s 
individual uniqueness is in fact a necessary faculty in the workings of the world.  
 It is through this paradox embedded for Emerson in symbolic expression --
providing both mediating but simultaneously liberating experience -- that Emerson 
believed can serve man to achieve the “original relation to the universe”. Using a well 
phrased depiction of this from Levin’s work, the concept of “Circles” is Emerson’s 
“testimony to the dynamic energies that outrun our best ideals, values, aspiration, or 
actions”279 in order to sustain man’s need and obligation of being Universe’s eye and 
voice of its perpetual self-overcoming. On these grounds skepticism and faith 
converge, for “neither rests in their meaning but [serve] as the exponent” (P: 196)280 
of the other - as Nature and “Experience” do.  
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 3.2. MYTH AS OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE 
 
 In the 1957, Ronald Barthes concludes his work Mythologies with the 
following lines: 
         It seems that this is a difficulty pertaining to our times: there is as yet only one 
possible choice, and this choice can bear only on two equally extreme methods: 
either to posit a reality which is entirely permeable to history and ideaologize or, 
conversely, to posit a reality which is ultimately impenetrable, irreducible, and , 
in this case, poetize. In a word, I do not yet see a synthesis between ideology and 
poetry […]. 
 The fact that we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality 
doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation: we constantly drift 
between the object and its demystification, powerless to render its wholeness. For 
if we penetrate the object, we liberate it but we destroy it; and if we acknowledge 
its full weight, we respect it, but we restore it to a state which is still mystified. It 
would seem that we are condemned for some time yet always to speak 
excessively about reality. This is probably because ideologism and its opposite 
are types of behaviour which are still magical, terrorized, blinded and fascinated 
by the split in the social world. And yet, this is what we must seek: A 
reconciliation between reality and men, between description and explanation, 
between object and knowledge.281  
Emerson has threaded this ground long before the post-modernist and 
deconstructionist speculations. His own search for what Barthes has called for over a 
century later lead him to conceptualize a scheme of direct “dependence of form upon 
soul” (P: 181)282, that anticipated the modern theorists’ emphasis on the qualitative 
aspect of reality, as opposed to the merely quantitative and discursive emphasis 
imposed by science. 
 In fact Emerson’s centripetal cosmology rendered through his body of essays 
stands in revolt to the discursive, rational conceptions. It represents what Ernst 
Cassirer defined in Language and Myth as the “mythmaking consciousness”; a 
conception of the world where the separate elements of the rational consciousness 
“are not thus separately given, but have to be originally and gradually derived from 
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the whole; the […] culling and sorting out individual forms” is still in process283. For 
this reason the mythic state of mind has been called “complex” state, coined by the 
ethnologist Karl Theodor Preuss, to distinguish if from the abstract analytic 
attitude284.  This state of mind is characterized by intensive compression, where all 
forces are imported to focus on a single point285 and Emerson’s essays as individual 
spheres possess this same characteristic. His essay does not compare itself to another; 
the pieces do not intentionally combine or follow in definite order in an all-inclusive 
context, in a closed system. Rather each work is captivated and rapt by its own 
specific atmosphere. Remembering Cassirer’s definition of mythical thinking, 
Emerson’s essay also “comes to rest in the immediate experience; […] [where its 
presence becomes] so great that everything else dwindles before it.”286 The very 
important result, of this mythical conception is, however, as Cassirer points out, the 
tension between the subject and the object: 
      [w]hen external reality is not merely viewed and contemplated, but overcomes a 
man in sheer immediacy, with emotions of fear or hope, terror or wish fulfillment: 
then the spark jumps somehow across, the tension finds release, as the subjective 
excitement becomes objectified, and confronts the mind as a god or daemon287. 
[…] the inner excitement which was a mere subjective state has vanished, and has 
been resolved into the objective form of myth or of speech.288 
Although Cassirer speaks there of the mytho-religious experience that gives rise to 
myth and language, it does reflect and explain Emerson’s own dynamic style of 
expression. It is for this reason that his scheme enables Nature and “Experience” to 
occupy psychological space in equal degrees, for they both are particular objectified 
forms of thus excited human consciousness. What Cassirer considered as the 
operation behind myth and word formation, that which Emerson described in 
“Circles” as the mysterious force that unsettles and shakes all “trivial toys” of 
mundane reality to be appropriated to the enlivened vision of the inflamed 
consciousness289, his essays demonstrate, for each presents a miniature of this myth-, 
word-making activity. It explains why often his essays are questioned for being 
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paradoxical or contradictory, and why their titles seem to never correspond to their 
content, for they represent the activity of a fervent consciousness seizing a certain 
concept or formulation only to transform it to a new meaning, creating new 
formulation - in fact not creating it, but revealing it, for as Emerson expressed in “The 
Poet” that meaning was there already imported by the universal Force, but waiting for 
human imagination to conceive it into form. It is in this process that Emerson 
envisioned society’s redeeming or reconciling aid to gaining a meaningful, 
“authentic” relationship with the Universe. Roland Barthes, contrastively, in his essay 
Myth Today considered this operation as scrounging and immobilizing, where myth 
works its power to give a historical concept a natural facade:  
      Myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose 
the memory that they once were made. The world enters language as a dialectical 
relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a 
harmonious display of essences. A conjuring trick has taken place; it has turned 
reality inside out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it with nature, it has 
removed from things their human meaning so as to make them signify a human 
insignificance. 290 
It is exactly this that Emerson fervently described throughout his “Circles” and 
embodied in his work Nature (q.v. Ch. 1). He further describes this process of the 
filling of human activity with nature by the particularly expressive, extended 
metaphor of “fossil poetry”: 
      As the limestone of the continents of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so 
language I made up of images, or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have 
long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin. (P: 190)291  
However, contrary to Barthes, Emerson’s depiction of this problem ceases to be 
understood as an artificial activity, “a conjuring trick”; rather it is a necessary 
process, part of universe’s self-sustaining and evolving activity. Most importantly, 
however, Barthes depiction of the mythologizing act is of a parasitic element that 
appends itself to a pre-established reality. However, as Cassirer points out, this 
conception of myth is still derived from the very analytical way of thought that in fact 
mythical consciousness is in opposition to, for the mythical consciousness “does not 
super-add [some mere products of fancy] to certain definite elements of empirical, 
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“realistic” existence292; instead, the new formulation is steeped in the imagery of the 
primary experience of the vision “and saturated with its atmosphere”293. It is this 
mode of expression that enabled Emerson to demonstrate both in content and style 
that “language never denotes simply things as such, but always conceptions arising 
from the autonomous activity of the mind. The nature of concepts therefore depends 
on the way this active viewing is directed”294: 
The termination of the world in a man, appears to be the last victory of intelligence. 
The universal does not attract us until housed in an individual. Who heeds the 
waste abyss of possibility? The ocean is everywhere the same, but it has not 
character until seen with the shore or the ship. Who would value any number of 
miles of Atlantic brine bounded by lines of latitude and longitude? Confine it by 
granite rocks, let it wash a shore where wise men dwell, and it is filled with 
expression […]. (MN : 122)295 
 This is not to claim however, that Barthes understanding of the mytho-poetic 
process is in contradiction to Emerson’s conception; rather the seeming contrast is 
due to the terminology. In fact what Barthes calls “myth” refers within Emerson’s 
scheme to the process of fossilization, of symbols turning to debilitating concepts that 
“seem” to possess their own natural essence merely because due to their daily use the 
human mind has forgotten about their creative agency. The only means that Barthes 
suggests that avoids such debilitating function of words and concepts is through what 
he calls “Revolutionary language”. By that he means a language that is “operational”, 
transitively linked to its object. He gives an example of a woodcutter, for whom a tree 
is no longer an image, but the meaning of the activity: “between the tree and myself 
there is nothing but my labour, that is to say, an action.” 
      But if I am not a woodcutter, I can no longer ‘speak the tree’, I can only speak 
about it […]. I no longer have anything more than an intransitive relationship with 
the tree this tree in no longer the meaning of reality as a human action […].296 
This rendering of an “operational” language in fact resembles closely Cassirer’s 
description of the mytho-poetic conceptualization and Emerson’s own claims about 
enrapt consciousness. For what Barthes refers to as the language of the “producer”, is 
in Emerson’s conception the door to that natural communion, the symbolic expression 
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that animates the world, forming the basis of  “Spiritual Laws”: “By doing his work 
[man…] unfolds himself”, and in so doing, by revealing his genius,  
      […] the quality that differences him from every other, the susceptibility to one 
class of influences, the selection of what is fit for him, the rejection of what is unfit, 
determines for him the character of the universe. As a man thinketh, so is he; and as 
a man chooseth, so is he and so is nature.297 
 Enrapture in the present moment of “being” is in Emerson’s scheme of a 
symbolically unfolding universe Barthes’ “Revolutionary Language”, for in that 
instance between man and nature is only his action. “Whenever man speaks in order 
to transform reality and no longer preserve it as an image”298 is according to Barthes 
the authentic expression. Emerson doesn’t use the term “Revolution” but “Power” to 
express the same: 
 […] The lightening which explodes and fashions planets, maker of planets and 
suns, is in him […] [t]he spirit which composes and decomposes nature.299  
 Thus, Emerson would agree with Barthes that the forms of mythical invention 
reflect not the objective character of things, but the forms of human practices; 
however man can attain his insight into reality only through this medium of this 
symbolic, myth-forming process, and is the reason why  
      we love the poet, the inventor, who in any form, whether in an ode, or in an action, 
or in looks and behavior, has yielded us a new thought. He unlocks our chains, and 
admits us to a new scene. (P: 196)300  
 
 
 3.3 THE MEDIUM 
 
 The epitome of the transformative, agentive Power is for Emerson the figure 
of the Poet. To remind once again, for Emerson symbols don’t merely represent 
something but present reality, therefore when Emerson claims in “The Poet” that “art 
is the path of the creator to his work,” (P: 199)301 it not only establishes the equality 
between art and life but simultaneously it presents the “positing” power of that 
symbolic sentence – the utterance generates that symbolic expression into life, 
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becoming reality.  Hence, not only does Emerson presuppose Kenneth Burke’s idea 
of language being a form of “symbolic action” but he goes on to claim “that actions 
are a kind of words.” (P: 184)302 From this basis emerges Emerson’s unique 
understanding of man’s relation to the world and his own comprehension of what it 
means when said “literature is a social creation”303.  
 What has been implied throughout the discussion of Emerson’s concept of 
symbolism is its integral role to social life. Indeed, all Emerson’s concerns in his 
writing with symbolism are formulated on the backdrop of the idea of social change – 
discharging Emerson’s emphasis of the individual importance over society in the 
evolution of culture and life in general. Already through the model of Nature and in 
the explication of “Circles” Emerson described how his notion of symbols stands for 
the vehicle of that generating, reviving force that can break through social stagnation 
and where he formulates his understanding that society itself is formed by these 
symbolic spheres, which are not permanent but shift correspondingly to the shift of 
human consciousness:  
The Natural world may be conceived of a system of concentric circles; and we now 
and then detect in nature slight dislocations, which apprise us that this surface on 
which we now stand is not fixed, but sliding. These manifold tenacious qualities, 
this chemistry and vegetation, these metals and animals, which seem to stand there 
for their own sake, are means and methods only , are words [my emphasis] of God 
[…]. (C: 152)304 
In “The Poet” he stresses that this symbolic power does not have its effect “second 
hand,”  
[m]an, never so often deceived, still watches for the arrival of a brother who can 
hold him steady to a truth, until he has made it his own. […] Such is the hope, but 
the fruition is postponed. Oftener it falls […] and [man loses his] faith in the 
possibility of any guide who can lead [him] thither where he would be [,] (P: 
185)305  
but instead, must be experienced as a personal insight in the moment of its 
occurrence:  
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of course, the value of genius to us is in the veracity [my emphasis]of its report. 
Talent may frolic and juggle; genius realizes and adds. (P: 185)306 
The import of the two ideas combined activated Emerson’s intuition that the 
next phase of humanity, the new social transformation, will require man reliant 
neither on social constructs nor religious covenants but man who, like his Poet, 
“in every word he speaks” realizes “he rides on [words] as the horses of 
thought” (P: 193)307. This notion, which he presents in “The Poet”,  that poetic 
language should be perceived as an active, formative presence in human life 
Emerson further confronted in his oration “The Method of Nature” and they 
come to crest in his essay “Poetry and Imagination”. It is also at this point that 
Emerson’s theory of expression foreshadows modern literary theorists’ 
assignment for imagination and fictionalization which shall be discussed 
towards the end of the section. 
 Although the exploration of the topic of symbolic expression was an 
activity that seems almost intuitive to Emerson’s own character of expression, 
where he at ease and with great reach described this power’s influence in almost 
all departments of human life, Emerson did employ great effort on finding a 
satisfying mode of expression that would encompass this three-act performance 
of God, Man, Nature that his theory of symbolic expression entailed. His “The 
Method of Nature” is a summation of this struggle. There he says: 
I do not wish in attempting to paint a man, to describe an air-fed, unimpassioned, 
impossible ghost. My eyes and ears are revolted by any neglect of the physical 
facts, the limitations of man. And yet one who conceives the true order of nature, 
and beholds the visible as proceeding from the invisible, cannot state his thought, 
without seeming to those who study the physical laws, to do them some injustice. 
[…] Empedocles undoubtedly spoke a truth of thought, when he said, “I am God;” 
but the moment it was out of his mouth it became a lie to the ear […]. (MN: 118 -
119)308  
Consequently, Emerson fittingly asks: Who could ever analyze the method of nature? 
(MN: 119) 309 His answer corresponds with Lévi-Strauss’ formulated almost 120 
years later (q.v. 1.4 and 4) that analysis is already a tapered attitude, and can’t grant 
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full service to either man or the world or the divine. Rather the method must not stem 
from the outside reality, but at the origin of its forms - in human consciousness. What 
facilitated Emerson on his quest for finding a representative method was his attraction 
to some of the theories of his day that claimed that the source of religious texts, such 
as the Gospels, was not from a document but an oral tradition. As Barbara Packer 
points out in her work “Origin and Authority: Emerson and the Higher Criticism”, 
      [t]he notion that the Gospels had once been a poetic cyclus of orally transmitted 
legends and apothegms from which each believer was free to make his own 
selection, the notion that the canon of Scripture was a product of human choice and 
hence open to human revision310   
must have resonated strongly with his own disbelief with mediators of faith and 
knowledge, as represented by the priests and scientists that defraud life by 
monopolizing all311. Instead the oral hypothesis suggested “texts” as self-revelatory 
“infinitely generous, infinitely generative”312 based on their immediate experience 
with the individual “reader”. Thus, in light of this developed idea of “revelation” by 
individual insight, the concept of Book or Text, for example the one of Nature, must 
be understood as a discourse rather than a fixed Word. For since the method of nature 
is a perpetual “emanation” (MN: 119)313 and man the symbol of its consciousness, the 
only approach for the way of the world is the “possibility of interpretation”314; an 
interpretation that recognizes man’s central role in this Universe’s unfolding story 
both as the reader or “experiencer” of the narration and for being the “experiencer” as 
the co-author as well, bringing us back to the symbol’s double-connotation: 
      A man is a center for nature, running out threads of relation through everything, 
fluid and solid, material and elemental. 315  
Emerson’s Poet embodies this particular kind of awareness where reality is not 
differentiated from experience, but by consciousness’ interpretive power reality is 
interpenetrated - given new meanings corresponding to the emotional bearing of the 
engaged, provoked moment; in other words, achieving what in the discursive, logical 
mode of consciousness is impossible: the “identity of the observer with the 
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observed”316 – the mythic consciousness discussed in the previous section. This “very 
high sort of seeing, which,” Emerson says, 
      does not come by study but by the intellect being where and what it sees, by 
sharing the path, or circuit of things through forms, and so making them translucid 
to others. (P: 192)317 
Only by means or action which “stimulate [the] instinct”, embodied by the Poet, that 
arouses the myth-generating consciousness will new passages be opened for us into 
nature (P: 193)318 and “it is of the last importance that these things get spoken” (P: 
199) 319 :  
      What a little of all we know is said! What drops of all the sea of our science are 
baled up! And by what accident it is that these are exposed, when so many secrets 
sleep in nature! Hence the necessity of speech and song; hence these throbs and 
heart-beating in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end, namely, that 
thought may be ejaculated as Logos, or Word. (P: 199)320 
It is on this plane Emerson converges human action with sacredness and the poetic act 
with the evolutionary process of nature – not as an activity separate but a medium for 
it - as this approach to life finds every individual directly answerable to the moral and 
the practical conduct of life, for such a world-view promotes  
       the isolated self only to the extent that by doing its own business, the self can 
forward the business of everything in the world that is not-self, or all the world’s 
energies-in-realization […].321 
Hence, his insistence, as Packer also emphasizes, that it is the Poet who above all 
“needs to acquire the ‘habit of saliency, of not pausing but going on’”322 to be a sort 
of “conductor of forces”323 and tap the pockets of the dormant potentialities of what 
Levin describes, “the relational matrix from which it derives strength and to which it 
returns that strength”324.  
 In this conceptualization, where the imaginative consciousness is identified by 
its function within the mythological realm that sustains human life, a concept 
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Emerson surmised in his “Poetry and Imagination”, lies the link between Emerson’s 
ideas of mythopoeia and contemporary theories of fictionalization.  
 “Poetry and Imagination”, almost as long as Nature, composed to the end of 
his life, formulates directly what his previous work has suggested - that his interest in 
human expression and symbol, and their role in society, is and was in fact “the 
interest in mythogenic power”.325  It is in this essay that Emerson openly expresses 
what he only provoked in his earlier works: that the experience of the Divine is 
possible only literarily through Man as a Natural need, by his extended trope of the 
“intellectual digestion”. 
 When he says in “Poetry and Imagination” that  
Poets are standing transporters, whose employment consists in speaking to the 
Father and to matter; in producing apparent imitations of unapparent natures, and 
inscribing things unapparent in the apparent fabrication of the world. (PI: 5)326 
And -- since the Poet is the epitome of what is shared by all men -- concludes, 
your condition, your employment, is the fable of you. The world is thoroughly 
anthropomorphized as if it had passed through the body and mind of man, and 
taken his mould and form. (PI: 6)327 
he describes that which was already echoed in his oration “The Method of Nature” -- 
the title suggesting this very same double-implication of  the concept of a usage or 
necessity -- where the “agent man” (method requires an agent) cannot be taken from 
the meaning, but Nature is in fact the possessor of the meaning. Thus man is doing 
service to Nature by employing his anthropological faculty for world-
conceptualization: 
it is true, he [man] pretends to give account of himself to himself, but, at last, what 
has he to recite but the fact that there is a Life not to be described or known other-
wise than by possession? What account can he give of his essence more than so it 
was to be? […] Oh rich and various Man! Though palace of sight and sound, 
carrying in their senses the morning and the night and the unfathomable galaxy; 
[…] The individual man is a fruit which it cost all the foregoing ages to form and 
ripen. The history of the genesis or the old mythology repeats itself in the 
experience of every child. He too is a demon or god thrown into a particular chaos, 
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where he strives ever to lead things from disorder into order. Each individual soul 
is such in virtue of its being a power to translate the world into some particular 
language of its own; if not into a picture, a stature, or a dance, - why, then into a 
trade, an art, a science, a mode of living, a conversation, a character, and influence. 
(MN: 122-123)328 
In this turn, as he called it, from “Christianity to Consciousness” - collapsing all 
divine mysteriousness into the relationship between human experience and nature, 
lead to an over-all translation of sacredness into a morphological phenomena. 
However, it is very important to keep in mind that through this translation the 
Spiritual or Divine is not getting lost. It remains as the unstirred given: “the invisible 
cords”, “the poem written before time”, “the Divine Reason” to which the agent of 
human imagination holds up life to see its value and meaning and transforms it to 
purpose and form. In this “[…] conversion of daily bread into the holiest symbols” 
(PI: 10)329 […] “every man would be a poet if his intellectual digestion were perfect” 
(PI: 10)330.  It is by means of this extended metaphor that Emerson explains his two-
way relationship of man to nature. In one way, man by using his gift of awareness 
fulfills his role to conceive the divine thoughts of Nature and, on the other hand, 
nature serves man “to realize the mind” (PI: 7)331; everything in the world works 
together for this ultimate purpose to express the Universe/al:  
All the parts and forms of Nature are the expression of production of divine faculties 
and the same are in us. And the fascination of genius for us is this awful nearness to 
Nature’s creations. (PI: 12)332  
Consequently, in “Poetry and Imagination” he assigns this faculty to “imagination”: 
the appendage that enables man to be the “eye/I” of the world that recites the episodes 
of its unfolding narrative: [in him] “the world projects a scribe’s hand and writes the 
adequate genesis.” (PI: 12)333 And hence Emerson’s call for the importance of 
mythology: 
[t]he test of measure of poetic genius Is the power to read the poetry of affairs, - to 
fuse the circumstance of today […]. ‘Tis easy to repaint the mythology of the 
Greeks, or of the Catholic Church, the feudal castle, the crusade, the martyrdoms of 
medieval Europe: but to point out where the same creative force is now working in 
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our own houses and public assemblies, to convert the vivid energies acting at this 
hour in New York and Chicago and San Francisco into universal symbols, requires 
a subtile and commanding thought. (PI: 10)334 
 This notion of mythopoeia and fictionalization as a human/natural necessity 
within the dialogue between “experiencer” and the “environment” or “reader” and the 
“text”  is on what modern literary theorists are basing their own formulations in the 
field, for example as demonstrated in Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response theory. 
Wolfgang Iser in the introduction to his The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting 
Literary Anthropology goes on to claim that due to the contemporary literature’s 
competition with other media and “the ever-increasing role that these play   
in our civilization […] literature has lost its significance as the epitome of our 
culture”335. He is asking then: “does literature […] have anything significant left to 
offer?”336  For Iser, the fact that despite the tough competition literature still exists 
signifies that “meeting the pragmatic needs of social life is not everything. […]”337. 
Stripping literature’s layers of  
this former, widely accepted forms of its legitimation […] [w]hat then comes into 
focus is the anthropological equipment of human beings, whose lives are sustained by 
their imagination.338 
 Iser fundamentally considers “imagination” as a ceaseless, subconscious process and 
“fictionalization” the rendered prospect out of the “multiplicity of possible 
outcomes”339. In his study Iser attempts to set up a mode of investigation of human 
self-interpretation through literature, where the fictive and the imaginary constitute 
the “evidential experiences”340. Although Iser does not recast his findings into the 
grander scope of Nature, the extensive exploration he employs into the subject of 
fictionalization’s anthropological necessity brings out significant parallels to 
Emerson’s theory of expression. Particularly the implications which arise from Iser’s 
stress on fiction being the mirror of human plasticity as the result of human need to be 
present to ourselves come to suggest Emerson’s ideas of the universe being a 
ceaseless metamorphosis: “The impossibility of being present to ourselves”, as Iser 
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says, “becomes our possibility to play ourselves out to the fullness that knows no 
boundary […].341 Here he puts forward the idea resembling Emerson’s theory that 
suggests that it is through the individual’s “playing out” his roles in life that can 
reveal the ultimate significance for human presence. Emerson’s states this in his 
particularly expressive language thus:  
we may, therefore safely study the mind in nature, because we cannot steadily gaze 
on it in mind; as we explore the face of the sun in a pool, when our eyes cannot 
brook his direct splendors.(MN: 118)342  
For both Iser and Emerson it is the faculty of narration and imagination that provide 
the inlets into this “study” for its ability that Iser called “boundary-crossing”; what we 
witnessed Emerson perform through his essays Nature and “Experience” for example 
or described in “Circles”, which we referred to as the “transitional dynamics” (q.v. 
3.1), we have Iser to describe as the ability of the  
fictionalizing act [to] convert the reproduced reality into a sign, simultaneously 
casting the imaginary as a form that allows us to conceive what it is toward which the 
sign points. […] Just as the fictionalizing act outstrips the determinacy of the real, so 
it provides the imaginary with the determinacy that it would not otherwise possess. In 
doing so, it enables the imaginary to take on an essential quality of the real, for 
determinacy is a minimal definition of reality.343  
And indeed Iser uses George Puttenham’s term “transitional object” for this 
fictionalizing act344 - what Emerson describes as “[t]he endless passing of one 
element into new form, the incessant metamorphosis,” which explain  
the rank which the imagination hold in our catalogue of mental power. The 
imagination is the reader of these forms. (PI: 4)345 
And thus Emerson’s Poet, 
 listens to conversations and beholds all object in Nature, to give back, not them but 
a new and transcendent whole. (PI: 5)346  
Emerson’s “transcendent” parallels with what modern literary theorists assign to 
the act of fictionalization: 
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transgressing the limits of extratextual systems as well as the boundaries of the text 
itself by pointing to the referential field that link the text to what is beyond the 
page.347 
Specifically to Emerson’s technique this is particularly augmented by two factors: 
first, by the contrast between his essay-form and highly poetic language and secondly, 
by his emphasis on the import of interlocution. In the case of the former, it was 
already Vico who explored the distinction between poetic expression on the one hand 
and discursive prose representation on the other and their effect on the human 
consciousness. As Hayden White explains, Vico emphasized the tension that creative 
and active force of the poetic expression and the passive, receptive operation of the 
prose establish within consciousness itself, “that generates a tendency of thought to 
transcend itself”.348 The fact that Emerson’s style merges prose and poetic language 
facilitates to produce the unique dynamism explained throughout the preceding 
sections; however, the “irony” produced by the contradiction leads to a particular 
problem. Vico considered “irony” as the last stage in the cycle of the development of 
consciousness where the use of irony indicates the consciousness’s awareness of the 
disparity between language and reality:  
Irony presupposes awareness of the distinction between truth and falsehood, of the 
possibility of misrepresenting reality in language, and of the difference between a 
literal and figurative representation.349 
In fact irony is a trope that points out that all other tropes, particularly metaphors, 
cease to represent.350 This brings up a problem, for Emerson’s style that employs 
irony contradicts his theory of expression that constitutes identification between 
language and experience of reality. To account for this “problem” is to realize the 
fundamental difference between Vico’s and Emerson’s conception of the relationship 
between consciousness and language. Vico thought of the development as cyclical, 
where each stage of a civilization constitutes a certain necessary form of expression 
based on the particular development but “over the course of such many cyclical 
recurrences culture in general is incrementally progressive.”351 Emerson would agree 
with the latter, where human consciousness takes part, as all nature, in progressive 
evolution; his emphasis, however, is on the idea that each and every man is a “new 
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man”. Hence, although consciousness is ceaselessly developing, every individual  
always experiences nature as a new encounter and thus always as Vico’s “primitive 
man” the narratives s/he construct are a representation of a “true” report of reality. 
Here of course surfaces the essential difference between the two theorists; whereas 
Vico attempted to provide explanation of the gentile culture’s development on the 
side of  the ideal Christian culture, Emerson unzipped Vico’s privileged stance of 
Christianity by translating the Christian’s direct revelation to experience itself: where 
the “true”, i.e. real and “false”, i.e. imaginary loose their antagonistic charge but are 
components of the greater whole, which can be revealed only through the transitive 
discourse which the two form the conditions for. This is very reminiscent of the 
German Romantics’ systems, in particular of Schlegel and Schelling for whom irony, 
the understanding of life as contradiction, facilitated the process of self-overcoming 
(q.v. 1.2). Irony in Emerson’s case instead of implying contradiction stand for the 
“limit” of each “generation” of thought (word, man, society) and the new generation 
which will origin from that ground cannot compare itself to the thought it succeeds 
because the old becomes part of its own sustenance; thus consequently, the new is the 
next limit, but not a contradiction or ironic reflection towards the old. This brings us 
to the second augmentation of Emerson’s “transcendent” – the persistent emphasis on 
the interlocution, where “The Poet must be a rhapsodist: his inspiration a sort of 
bright casualty” (MN: 126)352. Such emphasis rejects “written-down”, pre-formulated 
text; implying it cannot live up to the aspect of the “transcendent”, for it already pins 
something to the ground, hence foreshadowing the development in contemporary 
literary theory, such that of Iser, of the emphasis on the purpose of “the fictionalizing 
act”: that it  
brings about the presence of the imaginary by transgressing language itself. In 
outstripping what conditions it, the imaginary reveals itself as the generative matrix 
of the text.353 
This implies Emerson’s own fundamental assignment to the use of symbolic 
expression and imagination: the ability to conceive all in the many, essence in the 
words, mythopoeia in the myths:  
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The universal does not attract us until housed in an individual. Who heeds the 
waste abyss of possibility?[…]. So must we admire in man, the form of the 
formless, the concentration of the vast […]. See the play of thoughts! (MN: 122)354  
          In conclusion of this section, it is perhaps interesting to point out the significant 
link that comes out at this point between Emerson’s theory of expression and 
America’s own first “American”355 mythic story, Melville’s Moby Dick. Critics claim 
that in number of ways, Moby Dick stands in contrast to Emerson’s ideas, particularly 
to his notion of the self-reliant man, but on many levels the ideas Emerson had 
concerning text and imagination are further supported by even this story that attempts 
to refute the Emersonian Universe. Martin Procházka in his “Nature in Moby Dick 
and Emersonian Transcendentalism” says:  
Instead of the central self-reliant man of Emerson’s philosophy, the narrator of 
Melville’s Moby Dick appears to be an outcast, living on the margins of society.356 
And indeed, Ishmael is in many ways an “ironic counterpart of Emersonian self-
reliant man”357, however even the “outcast” through the act of narration/ 
fictionalization can make himself the center of that narrative universe - a life of 
whales as read through Ishmael’s experience –  
If only he sees, the world will be visible enough. He need not study where to 
stand, nor to put things in favorable lights; in him is the light, from him all 
things are illuminated, to their center. (MN: 123)358 
At this point it is impending to point out the predominant criticism of Emerson’s 
theory of expression for its anthropocentrism, one that Melville set out himself to 
challenge. The scope of this study does not permit a full confrontation of this 
problem; however, it should be recognized that Emerson on a number of occasions in 
fact stated that the anthropocentrism implied through man’s role of being the “eye” of 
the Universe is an impermanent fact, a transitive part itself in the greater 
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metamorphosis of Life, that the nature humans inhabit “has temporary use [and thus 
man] “can afford to leave it one day […]” (PI: 1)359 for 
[…] whilst we deal with this as finality, early hints are given that we are not to stay 
here, that we much be making ready to go. (PI: 1)360 
Here Emerson is not just implying the certainty of death, but through that passage 
implies that the growing interest of understanding this quality of man as the “I” of the 
Universe is the symbol of the very force that impelled it to take that form and thus 
depictive of Emerson’s own progression on the topic of the mythogenic power: “the 
interest is gradually transferred from the forms to the lurking method.” (PI: 2)361 
 
 It is perhaps not a coincidence then that Emerson’s proposal of his “new 
method”, where Nature is understood through the “narrative” of Experience and 
Experience being the “character” of Nature, predicts some of the important 
developments taking form in contemporary American scientific community: where 
the borders between narration and science begin to collapse into one another as the 
understanding of the universe’s cosmology being in fact a perpetual genesis is taking 
central stage: 
 The wholeness we admire in the order of the world, is the result of infinite 
distribution. Its smoothness is the smoothness of the pitch of the cataract. Its 
permanence is a perpetual inchoation. Every natural fact is an emanation, and 
that from which it emanates is an emanation also, and from every emanation 
is a new emanation. […] (MN: 119)362  
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 CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS A NEW SCIENCE 
 
 If Giambattista Vico with his New Science set the course for the establishment 
of the so-called social sciences and for their autonomy in their own right, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson anticipated through his theory of symbolic expression recourse for 
the “new science”; a growing interest in the convergence of the human and the 
natural. It is perhaps not surprising then that most evident manifestation of Emerson’s 
premonition of the necessity of the “new method” has been taking place in the field of 
modern anthropology.  
 Lévi-Strauss throughout his career seemed to have tackled the essential 
problem that characterizes Emerson’s work; the desire to learn about “nature” 
(particularly to Lévi-Strauss’ case about other men’s nature) “by uncovering its 
lawful relations among empirical facts”363, yet accompanied by the realization how 
much his own subjectivity penetrates into this quest and in fact how much of a 
necessity that subjectivism is:   
 History, politics, the social and economic universe, the physical world, even the 
sky, all surround me in concentric circles and I can only escape from those circles 
in thought if I concede to each of the some part of my being. Like the pebble which 
marks the surface of the wave with circles as it passes through it, I must throw 
myself into the water if I am to plumb the depths.364 
This contrasting approach culminated to a certain frustration, as Clifford Geertz 
describes in his study on Lévi-Strauss, where he felt “to be the victim of a double 
infirmity: what I see is an affliction to me; what I do not see a reproach.”365 The 
disappointment signals the shaping of an attitude towards science that dominated and 
became the main concern of his anthropological study, as he himself explained:  
Science has only two ways of proceeding: it is either reductionist or structuralist. It 
is reductionist when it is possible to find out what very complex phenomena on one 
level can be reduced to simpler phenomena on another level. For instance, there is a 
lot in life which can be reduced to physico-chemical processes, which explain a 
part but not all. And when we are confronted with phenomena too complex to be 
reduced to phenomena of a lower order, then we can only approach them  by 
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looking to their relationships, that is, by trying to understand what kind of original 
system they make up.366 
Or as Clifford Geertz summarized Lévi-Strauss’ analytical development:  
[w]hat a journey to the heart of darkness could not produce, an immersion in 
structural linguistics, communication theory, cybernetics and mathematical logic 
can. Out of the disappointed romanticism […] arose the exultant sciencism […].367 
However, it is at this point, in his turn to approaching culture as a sign system, where 
its constituents  are “arbitrary” units and thus the system is only creating meaning 
when “ordered, by the rules of grammar and syntax […]”368, that Lévi-Strauss, 
although inconspicuously, discloses his feelings of incompleteness of this whole 
system. Striking for our discussion is the fact, that his skepticism towards this 
rationalistic scheme has most been affected by what he learned through his study of 
myth. In Myth and Meaning he goes on to admit the “qualitative aspect of myth” that 
science has been ignorant of and concludes that,  
[w]hat is important is that we are becoming more and more interested in this 
qualitative aspect, and that science, which had purely quantitative outlook in the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, is beginning to integrate the qualitative aspects 
of reality as well. This undoubtedly will enable us to understand a great many 
things present in mythological thinking which we were in the past prone to dismiss 
as meaningless and absurd. And the trend will lead us to believe that, between life 
and thought, there is not the absolute gab which was accepted as a matter of fact by 
seventeenth-century philosophical dualism. If we are led to believe that what takes 
place in our mind is something not substantially or fundamentally different from 
the basic phenomenon of life itself, and if we are led then to the feeling that there is 
not this kind of gab which is impossible to over-come between mankind on the one 
hand and all the other living beings – not only animals, but also plants – on the 
other, then perhaps we will reach more wisdom, let us say, than we think we are 
capable of.369  
It is this that Lévi-Strauss described that Emerson’s theory of expression strived to 
represent – the two-way permeable exchange between nature and man: 
[…] all things in Nature, the animals, the mountain, the river, the seasons, wood, 
iron, stone, vapor, have a mysterious relation to [man’s] thoughts and his life; their 
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growths, decays, quality and use so curiously resemble himself, in parts and in 
wholes, that he is compelled to speak by means of them. His words and his 
thoughts are farmed by their help. Every noun is an image. Nature gives him, 
sometimes in a flattered likeness, sometimes in caricature a copy of every humor 
and shade in his character and mind. The world is an immense picture-book of 
every passage in human life. Every object he beholds is the mask of a man. (PI: 
3)370 
What begins rooted in distinct Cratylism by the end of the passage Nature’s 
projections are processed by man which then are projected back on Nature: “the 
reception that becomes giving in its turn, as the receiver is only the All-Giver in 
part and in infancy” (MN: 116)371. The over-coming of the gab that Lévi-Strauss 
described, Emerson achieved by conceiving man to literally be the organ of 
interpretation for this connection and develops a unique trope where human 
imagination feeds and digests the “surface facts of matter” (PI: 7)372, which are 
passed and “melted in Promethean alembic and come out men and then, melted 
again come out words […].” (PI: 5)373 The merit of the Poet is this perfect 
“intellectual digestion” (PI: 10)374, indeed an act surpassing the Romantics in 
the attempt to “divine the human and humanize the divine” for here man’s most 
essential biological process is necessitated for divine purpose. It is only when 
man gets taste of the world, experiences375 the world that he simultaneously 
carries out the divine purpose. 
 An evident example of the stress caused by Lévi-Strauss’ limiting scheme to 
account for the material of his study of human behavior is found in his article on “The 
Structural Study of Myth”. Although persistent in describing the function of myth 
through a structural system based on the combinatory law of variants, most of the 
time he is straining the very capacities of that system. This is particularly noticeable 
in the case he is making for the “bundles of relations”. He claims “[that] the true 
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constituent units of myth are not isolated relations but bundles of relations”376 for, 
essentially, as he recognizes, myth is not just a first order language system, but  
is [a] language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds 
practically at “taking off” from the linguistic ground on which it keep on rolling 
[and that] its substance does no lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but 
in the story [my emphasis] which it tells. 377  
Hence, his stacked “bundles” of comparable relations that are to be “read” as a whole 
to get at their “harmony” seems like a very wearisome and artificial take at what the 
myth already appears to provide in its intact composition and to undertake this 
wearisome analysis only for the sake of a system where the conclusion is that myth is 
“consisting of all its versions” and it is thus  
possible to organize all the known variants of a myth into a set forming a kind of 
permutation group, the two variants placed at the far ends being in a symmetrical, 
though inverted, relationship to each other [,] 378 
 reveals to us more about the craftsmanship of logical thought in general than 
anything of the myth’s import. 
 Therefore, although Lévi-Strauss recognized the quality of myth as a narration 
that essentially is about the quality and essence due to his own saturation in the 
inheritance of what Geertz called “the universal rationalism of the French 
Enlightenment”379,  he, like Barthes (q.v. chapter 3.2), was still not completely “led to 
believe that what takes place in our mind is something not substantially or 
fundamentally different from the basic phenomenon of life itself”, but was lead to 
deal with myth, and the other activities of human behavior in general, as the variants 
of a pre-established ideal base. 
 The parallel between Emerson’s theory of expression and modern scientific 
approaches forming in America rests in the emerging belief contradicting this 
unanimity between the experiential and internal reality of man. It is also what 
signifies the eccentric character of Emerson’s transcendentalism. As was emphasized, 
Emerson’s aim to “transcend” the physical and empirical rule over reality was not by 
soaring heights of abstract metaphysics or to the obscure “peace” of mysticism. His 
quest for transcending “the paltry idea of experience” did not satisfy by evaluating 
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some idealized set laws behind experience, for that only accounts, in his term, to 
“silence”. As “better” silence may be, for it represents the absolute understanding of 
All, “one in all parts,”(C: 151)380 it is not the expression of life; thus venturing to 
idealist speculations is as improvident as rationalist attempts to understand life 
without the human agency, i.e. “hunting for life in graveyards” (PI: 3)381. Rather, as 
he emphasized throughout his essay on “Poetry and Imagination”, “we sink to rise” 
(PI: 12)382; life is the ceaseless change, the dialogue between power and form and 
only the human mind partaking in that experience, with its gift of perception and 
speech, is its positing agent. Barbara Packer in her essay supports this through her 
summation of Emerson’s progress to formulating his distinct transcendentalism. She 
states, 
      […] Emerson is finally wearing himself from the concept of origins that had 
tantalized him for so long. An absolute origin has numinous prestige, but since it is 
different in essence from the texts which derive from it, its radiance mocks them 
even as they try faithfully to transmit it. By giving up the search for an origin, by 
finding radiance in the electricity generated by the differences between tropes 
rather than in the tropes themselves, Emerson appears to have solved the problem 
of inspiration- it is not something in the text, but something that is generated in its 
interstices, which is to say, in the reader.383 
She goes on to explain how he thus begins to be “intrigued by the idea that texts 
might give rise to inspiration, and not inspiration to texts”384, which leads then 
Emerson to conclude that 
      the best poet is a ‘huge borrower’ and that the term “originality” is simply the 
compliment we pay to the skill of his compilations or the daring of his thefts.385 
Packer there hints at the most significant result that Emerson’s transcendentalism has 
helped to produce. In contrast to Lévi-Strauss, whose “signs” of reality “reflect 
neither the time, nor the place, nor the circumstances”386 Emerson’s “symbols” are 
the products of the interaction of the human agent with his environment, which puts 
forward the basis of his theory that Levin called an “irreducibly relational identity” 
where “nothing in nature is truly isolated, including individual selves, but at the same 
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time the intricate web of nature only works because individual selves accomplish 
their various, individuated functions”387. Although his “theory” emerges from the  
subjectivist, ‘individual self’ that individual self conceives of its Self made-up of a 
particular amalgamation of its environment’s mythological depository; hence 
foreshadowing modernity’s understanding that such accounts of the “irreducible 
individual experiences” are necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
world. The genius of Shakespeare’s art is not, according to Emerson’s conception, 
because he is original, but because his “dazzling originality consisted not in 
invention, but in assimilation and recasting of the materials accumulated by the 
culture around him”388. Emerson explains that this is a secret that every great man 
learns,  
      that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious intellect, he is capable of a 
new energy (as of an intellect doubled on itself) by abandonment to the nature of 
things; that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there is a great public 
power, on which he can draw, by unlocking, at all risks his human doors, and 
suffering the ethereal tides to roll and circulate through him: then he is caught up 
into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his thought is law, and his words 
are universally intelligible as the plants and animals. (P: 193)389  
It is this that lies behind Emerson’s exclamation that Shakespeare worked the miracle 
of mythologizing the every day390 and what he meant in “Method of Nature” when he 
said “the only way into Nature is to enact our best insight” (MN: 131)391. 
 This concept of the human experience providing the insight into objective 
reality is directly related to the mythic conception. For as has been demonstrated the 
mythic conception is about the concentration into the present moment and that 
concentration depends on the direction of the particular’s subjects interest. Using 
again words of Ernst Cassirer’s explanation:  
   whatever appears important for our acting and willing our hope and anxiety, for 
acting and doing that and only that receives the stamp of verbal “meaning”392. […] 
For only what is related somehow to the focus point of willing and doing, only 
what proves to be essential to the whole scheme of life and activity, is selected 
                                               
387
 Levin, 31. 
388
 Packer, 89. 
389
 EaP 
390
 See reference no. 178. 
391
 EaL. 
392
 Cassirer, 37. 
 79 
from the uniform flux of sense impressions, and is “noticed” in the midst of them 
[…]393.  
Cassirer uses the example of Hermann Karl Usener’ study of Roman gods to illustrate 
this point:  
      Usener has shown us through the examples of the Roman ‘functional gods’ […] 
that ‘all their deities are entirely practically conceived, so to speak- conceived as 
being effective in those things which the Roman deal in his ordinary life; the local 
environment in which he moved, the various occupations in which he engaged, the 
occasions that determine and shape the life of the individual as well as the 
community – all these things are in the keeping of clearly conceived gods with 
definitely recognized powers[…].394  
Thus, just as the formation of gods stems from a direct outcome of man’s experience 
so are all other words and concepts and behavior the result of man’s experience 
objectified into symbolic expressions. It is this that Emerson described as the 
“sacred”, the mystery, the Power that puts forward this expression in nature and 
necessitates men to turn to such expression:  
Every line we can draw in the sand has expression; and there is no body without its 
spirit or genius. All form is an effort of character; all condition, of the quality of the 
life;[…] The beautiful rests on the foundations of the necessary. (P: 186)395 
This which Emerson finds as the convergence of art and essentiality transmits his 
belief that the only way to cultivate this sacred communion is for individuals to be 
present and to present their experience in order to put forward the unfolding 
narrative.  
  An epitome example how Emerson’s “intellectual digestion” can serve as a 
method for both scientific account and inquiry is the interpretative method of Clifford 
Geertz’s anthropological work. For Geertz the understanding that symbols guide 
action and human behavior constitutes the basis of his scientific approach. He 
considers doing ethnography for the same process as reading a manuscript.396 Thus 
striking a parallel with Emerson concerning “text’s” identity:  
Though ideational, it does not exist in someone’s head; though unphysical, it is not 
an occult entity. […]Once human behavior is seen as […] symbolic action […] the 
question as to whether culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, or even 
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mixed together, loses sense. […] The thing to ask is what their import is […] in 
their occurrence and through their agency, is getting said.397 
Consequently, Geertz, similarly to what Emerson voiced as the intention of the “The 
Poet” that, “the chief value of the ‘new fact’ is to enhance the great and constant fact 
of Life”, claims that, “the aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the universe of 
human discourse”398 by trying to form “fictions” (stresses the original term of fictio as 
meaning something “made” or “fashioned”) of the imaginative/symbolic realm 
posited by other people. For, he asserts, 
what [in a foreign place] most prevents [us] from grasping what people are up to 
is not ignorance as to how cognition works as a lack of familiarity with the 
imaginative universe which their acts are signs.399 
Geertz’s anthropological endeavor resembles those of the mediating Poet, where 
through his proposed “interpretation” of the symbols “[m]en have really got a new 
sense, and found within their world another world, or nest of worlds […]” (P: 194)400. 
Moreover, for Geertz the important part of understanding culture is to interpret its 
symbols based on the experience that it derives from, that includes the people, the 
person, the environment, the time, because as he says,  
there is little profit in extricating a concept from psychologism only to plunge it 
immediately into those of schematicism. 
Behavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is through the 
flow of behaviour – or, more precisely, social action – that cultural form find 
articulation.401 
Geertz here stresses the limitation of the structuralists’ (rationalists’ in general) 
approaches to symbols. He disagrees that merely the intrinsic relationships between 
symbols can grasp human activities, claiming that 
Whatever, or wherever, symbol system ‘in their own terms’ may be, we gain 
empirical access to them by inspecting events, not by arranging abstracted entities 
into unified patterns.402 
Furthermore, he claims that such structuralists’ systems’ assertions to coherence 
actually speak against their validity, for  
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[n]othing has done more, I think, to discredit cultural analysis than the construction 
of impeccable depictions of formal order in whose actual existence nobody can 
quite believe.403 
Similarly to what Martin Procházka referred to as the “reversal of the hierarchy of 
text and commentary”404 that takes place in Moby Dick -- a turnaround essential to 
Emerson’s theory -- Geertz also attacks the widespread notion of the supremecy of 
formal, “authorative” texts in their claim to “truth”. Instead, Geertz’s proposal of his 
“thick description” emphasizes the need for an interpretation that “construct[s] a 
reading [my emphasis] of what happens”405, for  
to divorce it from what happens – from what, in this time or that place, specific 
people say, what they do, what is done to them, from the whole vast business of the 
world – is to divorce it from its application and render it vacant.406 
His study and account of Balinese life reflects the implementation of this 
concentrated interpretation. Just as a fervent story-teller, Geertz sets the context, 
introduces the characters, and reveals his own disposition towards the milieu he 
observes. The vividness of the account and rendering of details in attempt to invoke 
the atmosphere of that particular environment is what gets the readers to 
imaginatively be present in the “story”. Only by “being there” and experiencing the 
moment does the reader “understand” the implications of the social relations and 
human behavior, for humans can only really grasp new knowledge by emotional 
involvement or rapture  – that activity  performed by Emerson in his own essays and 
described by Cassirer of becoming objectified to a new form (q.v. chapter 3.2). 
Hence, in light of Emerson’s claim that 
 […] as the power of genius of nature is ecstatic, so must its science or the 
description of it be [,] (MN: 126)407 
 Geertz literally illustrates this “door opening” to new knowledge gained through 
narrative interpretation by his inclusion of a dramatic account of him and his wife 
being part of an Indonesian police raid: 
It was the turning point so far as our relationship to the community was concerned, 
and we were quite literally ‘in’. The whole village opened up to us, probably more 
than it ever would have otherwise […]. Getting caught, or almost caught, in a vice 
                                               
403
 Ibid.,18. 
404
 Procházka, 42. 
405
 Geertz,18. 
406
 Ibid. 
407
 EaL. 
 82 
raid is perhaps not a very generalizable recipe for achieving that mysterious 
necessity of anthropological field work, rapport, but for me it worked very well. It 
led to a sudden and unusually complete acceptance into a society extremely 
difficult for outsiders to penetrate. It gave me the kind of immediate, inside-view 
grasp of an aspect of ‘peasant mentality’ that anthropologists not fortunate enough 
to flee headlong with their subject from armed authorities normally do not get. 
And, perhaps most important of all […] it put me very quickly on to a combination 
of emotional explosion, status war, and philosophical drama of central significance 
to the society whose inner nature I desired to understand.408 
Not only is the account an illustration of an example from life how participation in 
experiences affects our knowledge of the world, but the very account on its textual 
level works as a symbol for those very experiences. Most of the events/activities that 
Geertz describes in his narratives possess this double “life”, where on their initial 
level they are the symbols of the “living” symbols in forms of actions that posit a 
certain reality and hence then can function at their second, textual level as the 
mediating symbols of that reality in the imaginative realm of the text. Thus, similarly 
to Emerson’s style, the tropes of the account become “performative”. As in Nature 
where Emerson achieved through his tropes to create the very composition of Nature 
being the becoming of the myth, or the “theory of Experience” to literally eat-itself up 
through the very account of “Experience”, Geertz narrative achieves the same effect, 
for his symbols function on the same level of positing an unfolding action, where the 
reader does not merely obtain an analogy of a reality, but perceives the unfolding of 
the reality in the dynamics of the language of the text - what Cassirer described as the  
      point where the word which denotes that thought content is not a merely 
conventional symbol but is merged with its objects in an dissoluble unity The 
conscious experience is no merely wedded to the word, but is consumed by it. 
Whatever has been fixed by a name, henceforth is not only real, but is Reality .409 
Exemplified also by Iser, who on this point supports fiction’s value and import to 
knowledge as important as other sources: 
Fiction operates in actual worlds in much the same way as nonfictions. Cervantes and 
Bosch and Goya, no less than Boswell and Newton and Darwin, take and unmake and 
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remake and retake familiar worlds, recasting them in remarkable and sometimes 
recondite but eventually recognizable – i.e. re-cognizable- ways.410 
Here, echoing Emerson’s remark that “science does not know its debt to imagination” 
(PI: 3)411, in other words, the Poet’s ability to not merely invent but recast the world 
in a meaningful, up to date projection:  
All that is wondrous in Swedenborg is not his invention, but his extraordinary 
perception; - that he was necessitated so to see. The world realizes the mind.      
(PI: 6)412 
Geertz provides his own explanation of this “point” on the level of behavior/action, 
through his explication of the village cockfights in Bali: 
Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of 
Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves. […] 
[…] To treat the cockfight as a text is to bring out a feature of it […] that treating it as a 
rite or pastime […] would tend to obscure: its use of emotion for cognitive ends.413. 
As was René Wellek’s reaction to Emerson’s composition: “criticism can only be 
empathy and identification”414, for Geertz that is of the same importance, for he 
stresses that such accounts - the highlighting of the “complex specificness”, the 
“circumstantialities” of human activities” - 
      give the sort of sensible actuality that makes it possible to think not only 
realistically and concretely about them, but what is more important creatively and 
imaginatively with them.415 
In another of his studies Geertz explains the human mind as essentially 
“dispositional”, that  
[w]hen we attribute mind to organism, we are talking about neither the organism’s 
actions nor its products per se, but about its capacity and its proneness, its 
disposition, to perform certain kinds of actions and produce certain kinds of 
products […].416 
Here Geertz is reciting what for Emerson was the encompassing matter of his interest: 
the spirit, power, utility assigned to men, being “the necessary actor” whose 
performance “[...] infuses a certain volatility and intoxication into All Nature” (PI: 
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5)417 and concurrently corresponding to Iser’s literary anthropology that asserts that 
narrative-building serves man to explore the  
 complexities of action [through its] imaginary constructs that set free possibilities 
inherent in situations and does not pin them down to any pre-given conditions418.  
They both reaffirm Emerson’s rejection of and disbelief in all pre-formulated “texts” 
for experience is the unfolding Text in need of constant, up to date interpretation, to 
see: 
[o]ur logrolling, our stumps and their politics, our fisheries, our Negroes, and 
Indians, our boats, and our repudiations, the wrath of rogues, and the pusillanimity, 
of honest men, the northern trade, the southern planting, the western clearing, 
Oregon and Texas, are yet unsung. Yet America is a poem in our eyes; its ample 
geography dazzles the imagination, and it will not wait long for metres. (P: 198)419 
 Hence, symbolic expression is for both Geertz and Emerson the medium 
for this “capacity and proneness”, for it is not concerned with existential 
phenomenon alone neither merely with the isolated subject but is the process of 
“boundary-crossing” (q.v. 3.4) the two set to motion and that infuse life with 
new and “deeper but never definite or absolute meanings.”420 Hence, Geertz 
could speak for both of them when he claims:  
 To look at symbolic dimensions of social action – art, religion, ideology, science, 
law, morality, common sense – is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas 
of life for some empyrean realm of de-emotionalized forms; it is to plunge into 
the midst of them.421 
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 CONCLUSION 
  
 In his work Dangerous Pilgrimages Malcolm Bradbury demonstrates to what 
extent from the very beginnings “boundary crossing” has informed not only the 
American sensibility and imagination, but reality itself. In the very process of 
America’s discovery its narrative has already been unfurling – “in the search of 
freedom, the hope of opportunity, the hunger for wealth […]”422, the physical 
voyages were accompanied with the “journeys of the imagination, a flourishing traffic 
in fancy, fiction, dream and myth”423 – indeed “arriving” in America even before 
leaving.  From such a history it is hardly a surprise that America would initiate a truly 
serious inquiry into the value of the mythopoeic consciousness. The New World has 
become the epitome of how fictionalization constitutes reality and commands human 
action, and progressively becoming recognized as an indispensable faculty of the 
human physiology. Hence, America not only being the scene for the emergence of a 
new myth, it is also the scene of an emerging new science of the new man, “the 
symbol using animal”424.  
 The first American thinker that directly confronted this issue of mythopoeic 
power over man and over life, investigating its uncharted territory, was R.W. 
Emerson, and indeed his own exploration proving, in true sense of the term, a 
“dangerous pilgrimage”. For what has begun as a mission in search of an authentic 
relationship between man and God took him by each step further into exploring the 
interaction between man and nature instead. However, this didn’t accumulate to a 
rejection of spirituality; on the contrary, it stimulated his inquiry further for his 
attraction to the special union man shares with nature compared to the other creatures 
– a union embodied by symbolic expression. In turn to the European Romantics for a 
sense of confirmation for his intuitive attraction to the power of symbolism and poetic 
language, he began to chart his own “theory” that extended beyond the Romantics’ 
call for a new mythology. Emerson’s far-reaching investigation into the workings of 
myth and symbols unveiled for him its paradoxical nature: at the time it creates it is 
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on the way to debilitate, and when it breaks it entails the power of creativity. Hence, 
his initial faith for his private belief and skepticism towards deceptive constructs of 
society converged into his lifetime interest in the mythopoeic power. It is this interest 
that instigated and exalted his theories, concerning spirituality, man, nature, society, 
experience, poetics; indeed demonstrating the power of myth’s “transitive unifier”.  
 His unique conception of the “transcendent” that literally merges the human 
with the divine cause and simultaneously the human with the natural instigated a 
necessary recognition of the value and purpose of the fictional and imaginary for 
human life. Hence, Emerson’s exploration of this topic, which has not only been 
expressed through his ideas, but demonstrated through his writing style, anticipated 
contemporary literary and scientific communities’ emerging interest in the 
mythopoeic act of “bringing possibility over into the realm of being”425 and what it 
means to man in his interaction with the world.  For Emerson that utility provided 
him with the fruit of his endeavor: man’s authentic experience of the sacred. Through 
his inquiry of the mythopoeic act he came to recognize that it is exactly man’s unique 
interaction with the natural world -- man’s experience of the world-- that unveils to 
man God’s Word and it is man’s necessity to keep reading the Divine narrative, the 
perpetual genesis, as it unfolds; for “what is a man but nature’s finer success in self-
explication?”426 
 In effect, Emerson proposed a genuinely “modern Myth”, modern not only in 
the sense that it is “new”, but modern by embodying the very power to surpass what 
the modern, rational mind has come to regard as the limiting, dangerous facet of the 
human consciousness. In a sense, he de-mythologized myth in order to put forward 
the new mythology: the old being the exponent to the new thought. 
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CZECH ABSTRACT 
Souhrn v českém jazyce 
 
 
V rámci moderní literární kritiky a amerických kulturních studií se dílo R.W. 
Emersona přednostně považuje za prototyp pragmatické teorie a také se tak 
klasifikuje. Přílišný důraz na to, že Emerson předpověděl americký pragmatismus, 
ovšem ve skutečnosti zastiňuje zrod těchto idejí, které původně ve své podstatě 
ztělesňují ideu „přerodu“.   
Významný je fakt, že se Amerika zrodila ve věku rozumu, a že se na počátku 
devatenáctého století postavila do čela technologického pokroku, čímž vykročila ke 
svým pragmatickým, moderním snahám, ale byl zde i další významný činitel, který 
hrál určující roli ve formování „modernosti”: její přímé setkání s fikčně vábivým 
prostorem “nového světa”.  Tyto dva faktory způsobily dramatickou změnu vědomí. 
Nové a pozměněné perspektivy světa si žádaly nový vztah člověka k jeho prostředí, 
čímž iniciovaly přesun původních idejí do nových představ. Jinými slovy daly 
vzniknout novým pohledům na svět a novým mýtům. Uznává se, že Emerson byl 
důležitou částí této „přetvářející“ činnosti, důležitější ovšem je, že si to postupně začal 
uvědomovat i on sám, a tudíž vážně zkoumal pojetí mýtotvorné síly jak ve své práci, 
tak v lidském životě obecně. Z toho důvodu je jediná interpretace jeho souhrnného 
díla v protikladu k jeho ambici formulovat fungování mýtu a jeho přerodné 
schopnosti. Tato studie se pokouší odhalit Emersonův text ve světle jeho 
mýtotvorného zájmu a demonstrovat, že v jeho díle byla jednotnost stejně důležitá 
jako mnohost, ustrnutí stejně jako akce, protože stojí v cestě přeměny, kterou, jak 
Emerson věřil, mýtotvorba prochází. Navíc se tato studie snaží nastínit, – za účelem 
zdůraznění – do jaké míry jeho vlastní teorie mýtotvorného a symbolického 
vyjadřování předjímala rostoucí uvědomění důležitosti mýtického a imaginativního 
vyjadřování samotné Ameriky a lidské zkušenosti. 
Výklad diplomové práce se soustředí na Emersonovy eseje, protože v této 
formě vyprávění byl Emerson nejlépe schopen prozkoumávat a demonstrovat 
mýtotvornou funkci, a to nejen skrze dosah a důležitosti jejich významu, ale také 
skrze stylistické a expresivní ztvárnění na textovém povrchu/textové rovině. Eseje 
Nature a “Experience” byly vybrány, aby posloužily jako hlavní modely pro 
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předvedení Emersonova zkoumání mýtotvorné funkce, jelikož nejenže dobře 
reflektují Emersonovy vlastní vyvíjející se představy o mýtu, ale také představují 
ztělesnění dvojí konotace mýtotvorby: je ničivá i osvobozující ve své podstatě. Jiné 
eseje, jež byly zahrnuty do studie, jsou ty, které jsou důležité v rámci vysledování 
Emersonova progresivního vývoje této jeho teorie symbolického vyjádření: “Circles” 
z jeho Essays, “The Poet” a “Nature” z jeho Essays Second Series a “Poetry and 
Imagination” – nepříliš známé dílo, mající však velký přínos pro tuto studii. Dále 
tvoří významnou část práce také  Emersonova řeč “Method of Nature”. Svými 
důležitými náhledy do mýtotvorného tématu podporuje tvrzení vytvořená na základě 
esejí. Další podpora a argumenty byly čerpány z Emersonových soukromých spisů. 
Jako spisovatel byl Emerson plodný a jeho deníkové zápisky, dopisy a jiné, méně 
relevantní eseje jsou důležitými materiály pro studium této problematiky.  
Kapitola 1. podává přehled definicí mýtu a chápání mýtu v moderní literární 
kritice a filozofii a uvádí hlavní problémy a debaty související s tématem ve světle 
Emersonova vlastního bádání. Kapitola zdůrazňuje, že určení „mýtu“ není 
jednoduché, protože tento výraz zdá se získal platnost pro řadu různorodých definic. 
Například pro F. Maxe Müllera je mýtický svět v podstatě světem iluze, která je 
způsobená vrozenou vadou jazyka 427 - “chorobou jazyka” 428, pro německé 
romantiky však představuje naopak nejvyšší formu pravdy429. Navíc již od dob 
Nietzscheovy filozofie dospěla tato předpokládaná antinomie fikce a pravdy jako 
takové k radikálnímu opětovnému přezkoumání. Proto jediným způsobem, jak dospět 
ke vhodnému pojetí „mýtu“, je nechápat ho jako něco, co definuje jediný neměnný 
pojem, ale jako zvláštní stav vědomí, který se nevymezuje kontrapozicí opačných 
pólů „smyšlenosti” a “reality” (tato opozice, jak například Wolfgang Iser podotýká ve 
svém díle The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Antropology, již 
implikuje jistý stupeň mytologizace), ale interakcí obou. První kapitola probírá 
nejpodstatnější teorie týkající se tohoto měnícího se tématu mytologie v rámci 
literárních studií a filozofie. Začíná diskuzí o hlavní roli, kterou mýtus hraje 
v evropském romantickém hnutí hlavně pro německé a anglické  romantiky a 
vymezením míry, do jaké Emerson sám sebe mohl utvrzovat ve svých přesvědčeních 
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a teoriích v programu romantiků. Diskuze se poté přesouvá k dílu Giambattisty Vica, 
protože to byl právě on, kdo jako první pojal mýtus jako autonomní téma a stál u 
základů snahy o „Novou vědu“ –  otočení vědeckého bádání „dovnitř“. Tím, že 
položil základy pro spojení těchto dvou zdánlivých protikladů, předejmul Vico 
pozdější přístupy k mytologii – implicitně v případě  romantiků, jako například u 
Schellingova and Schlegelova „psychofyzického paralelismu“ 430 jejich systémů, 
obzvláště však v případě moderních přístupů, jako například Jungova 
psychologického přístupu, psycholingvistických studií Ernsta Cassirera, filozofie 
„As-If“ Hanse Vaihingera, mýtu jako sémiologického systému u Rolanda Barthese a 
Claude Lévi-Strausse a teorie kultury Clifforda Geertze, jež jsou výsledkem tendence 
„naturalizovat nadpřirozeno a polidšťovat božské.431 Emersonovy vlastní teorie 
vycházely z tohoto tématu a přispívaly k jeho nevyčerpatelnému proudu. Přehled 
těchto souvisejících teorií se pokouší stanovit kulturně-literární kontext mýtu, aby 
sloužil jako pozadí, na kterém je možné sledovat jeho vlastní dynamiku. Podstatným 
faktem, který první kapitola zdůrazňuje od začátku do konce a který je důležitý pro 
další diskuzi o Emersonově mýtotvorbě, je to, že Mýtus má schopnost být zároveň 
mýtoborný a mýtotvorný a měnící se přístup vědomí ke vztahu mezi „mýtem” a 
„realitou” demonstruje přeměnu a složitosti mytologizující aktivity samotné.  
Kapitola 2. se zabývá postupným vývojem Emersonova zájmu o mýtus a 
mytologii. První část demonstruje, jak už v raném věku byl fascinován osvobozující, 
a přitom svazující silou víry, a zabývá se smíšenými pocity, které Emerson měl vůči 
moderním racionálním přístupům ke světu. Tato distinktivní směs víry a skepse udala 
směr jeho pozdějšímu prozkoumávání mýtotvorné schopnosti. Druhá kapitola též 
situuje Emersona v kontextu dramaticky se měnícího světa kolem něj. Není tedy 
náhodné, ale naopak spíše historicky symbolické, že ve chvíli, kdy Emerson rozvíjel 
svůj postoj vůči identitě, víře a autoritám, procházela i Amerika jako národ přerodem 
vědomí. Díky své citlivé a pronikavé mysli Emerson chápal, že neexistuje adekvátní 
vypravěčský postup pro obyvatele Ameriky devatenáctého století, kteří „bojovali, aby 
se dokázali orientovat v kosmu alarmujících nových rozměrů“432. „Zkušenost 
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každého nového věku si žádá nového přiznání a svět se zdá vždy být v očekávání 
svých básníků”433 - tento Emersonův výrok nejen vyjádřil onu absenci, ale zároveň i 
autorovu odhodlání tuto mezeru vyplnit a odpovědnost, kterou za to pociťoval. 
V reakci na to, co považoval za prázdnotu americké představivosti způsobenou 
neschopností vysvětlit „nová fakta“ vyvstanuvší z Nového světa, položil ve své eseji 
Nature tuto otázku: „Proč bychom si neměli […] užívat originálního vztahu k 
vesmíru?”434 Položení této otázky bylo činem v souladu s analogií Nového světa 
Sacvana Bercovitche – „moderní svět“ jako ztělesnění „moderního mýtu“435, 
definující americký přístup k tvorbě mýtu. Jeho pojetí návrhu nového mýtu vyplynulo 
z jeho pečlivého studia moci této schopnosti. Pokud Amerika byla v té době 
mezníkem pro přerod lidského vědomí, zatímco se postupně stala „moderním 
světem“, je pochopitelné, že její mytologie odráží sílu tohoto „přerodu“. Emersonův 
zájem o mýtus a odpor k němu se spíše než do tvorby nových mýtů rozvinul do 
„zájmu o mýtotvornou sílu“ 436.  Pro něj je „umění  […] v procesu. Konečný produkt 
značí konec, smrt [...], bod, ve kterém nastane zkostnatění“437. Slovy Jonathana 
Levina: „více se zajímal o způsob, jak věříme a pochybujeme – reálný proud 
prožívání, než o systém víry nebo systematicky udržovanou skepsi“438. Kapitola se 
poté detailně opírá o Emersonova díla, která nejlépe reprezentují mýtotvornou 
schopnost, tedy o Nature a „Experience“. Přestože jsou tato díla kritiky nejčastěji 
považována za sobě si odporující, výklad těchto textů ve světle mýtotvorného 
vyjádření odhaluje, že ve skutečnosti se jedno druhého zastává a odráží Emersonovu 
celoživotní fascinaci tajemnou, ustavičnou mocí, která utváří a upevňuje myšlenky, 
aby je následně opět rozmělnila. 
Třetí kapitola se věnuje dvojité konotaci, kterou Emerson nachází 
v mýtotvorné síle a jejím vztahu vůči užívání jazyka a symbolů. Tato kapitola 
demonstruje, jak zájem o mýtotvorbu zformoval Emersonovu konkrétní teorii 
vyjadřování, a sleduje tento vývoj na základě jeho esejí pojednávajících o jazyce a 
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symbolickém vyjadřování, z nichž jsou nejdůlažitějšími “Circles”, “The Poet” a 
“Poetry and Imagination”. Dále tato kapitola ukazuje, jak Emersonova vlastní teorie 
vyjadřování (obzvláště myšlenka, že lidské prožívání, na rozdáíl od empirických věd, 
povoluje skrze zprostředkovatelskou sílu symbolického vyjadřování průnik do 
objektivní reality) odkazuje na teorie lingvistů a filozofů přímo se zabývajících 
mýtem a mýtotvorným povědomím.  Kapitola se primárně zaměřuje na Ernsta 
Cassirera, Rolanda Barthese a Wolfganga Isera. Emersonovo unikátní pojetí 
„transcedence,“ o které Emerson také referoval jako o „intelektuálnímu zažítku,“ 
doslova spojuje lidskou podstatu s božskou, a zároveň lidskou s přirozenem a 
podnítilo nutné poznání hodnoty a účelu fikce a imaginárního v lidském životě. 
Z toho důvodu předjímalo Emersonovo prozkoumávání tohoto tématu, které nejenže 
bylo vyjádřeno jeho idejemi, ale také demonstrováno jeho literárním stylem, 
vzrůstající zájem současné literární a vědecké komunity o mýtotvorný akt  “přenesení 
možnosti do sféry bytí”439 a co tento akt  znamená pro člověka v jeho interakci se 
světem.  
 Paralela mezi Emersonovou teorií vyjadřování a moderními vědeckými 
postupy vytvářenými ve Spojených Státech leží ve vzrůstající víře v jednotu 
prožívané a interní reality člověka. Pokud Giambattista Vico svou Novou vědou udal 
směr pro založení takzvaných společenských věd a pro jejich vlastní autonomii, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson svou teorií symbolického vyjadřování předjímal přesměrování 
„nové vědy“ a rostoucí zájem o propojení lidského a přírodního. Asi tedy není 
překvapivé, že nejzjevnější projev Emersonovy  předtuchy nutnosti „nové metody“ je 
patrný v rámci moderní antropologie. Poslední kapitola ukazuje vztah mezi 
Emersonovou snahou najít vhodný popis „nové zkušenosti“ člověka a vzrůstajícím 
zájmem vědecké komunity současné Ameriky o splývání vyprávěčských postupů a 
empirismu. Příkladem, jak Emersonovo „intelektuální vnímání”, probrané 
v předchozí kapitole, může sloužit jako metoda jak pro vědecké zkoumání, tak pro 
popis, je interpretační metoda antropologické práce Clifforda Geertze. Základam 
Geertzova vědeckého přístupu je jeho přesvědčení, že symboly vedou činnost a lidské 
chování. Považuje etnografii za stejný proces jako čtení textů.440 Symbolické 
vyjádření pro Geertze i Emersona představuje médium pro jedinečnou vlastnost 
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„schopnosti/sklonů“ člověka a jeho hodnotu nacházejí se v samotné jeho povaze: že 
se nezabývá samotným existenčním fenoménem a ani nepojednává o jednotlivici jako 
izolovaném předmětu, ale že je procesem „překračování hranic“, který tyto dva 
uvádějí v pohyb a vlévají do života nové a “hlubší, ale nikdy ne konečné či absolutní 
významy.”441 Emersonův dalekosáhlý průzkum fungování mýtu a symbolů mu 
odhalil jeho paradoxní podstatu: ve chvíli, kdy stvoří, zároveň již zeslabuje, a ve 
chvíli zlomu nastává spojení se silou kreativity. Proto se jeho původní důvěra ve svou 
víru a jeho skepse vůči klamným konstruktům společnosti soustředily v jeho 
celoživotním zájmu v mýtotvornou sílu. Právě tento zájem inicioval i dovršil jeho 
teorie týkající se duchovna, člověka, přírody, společnosti, lidské zkušenosti, poetiky. 
Skutečně demonstruje sílu „tranzitivního unifikátora“442. Využití mýtu přineslo 
Emersonovi výsledky jeho snahy o autentickou zkušenost posvátna. Průzkumem 
mýtotvorného aktu došel k poznání, že je to právě ona unikátní interakce člověka 
s přirozeným světem (zkušenost člověka na ve světě), která mu odhaluje Slovo boží, a 
že je pro něj nutností nadále číst božské vyprávění, trvalou genesis, tak, jak se odvíjí. 
Protože „co je člověk jiného než úspěšnější sebevysvětlení přírody“443? V důsledku 
navrhl Emerson skutečně „moderní Mýtus“, jenž je moderní nejen v tom smyslu, že 
je „nový“, ale také proto, že je ztělesněním samotné schopnosti předstihnout to, co 
moderní, racionální mysl začala považovat za omezující; nebezpečnou stránku 
lidského vědomí. V jistém smyslu demytologizoval mýtus, aby mohl představit 
mytologii novou; stará myšlenka stoupencem nové.  
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